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This study examines registrants’ incentives to disclose internal control
weaknesses (ICWs) voluntarily in IPO registration statements and their post-IPO
financial reporting quality. Using a sample of initial public offering (IPO) registrants
from 2005-2013, I find that increasing management’s disclosure credibility, by hiring a
new CEO in the IPO, is an incentive to include ICWs in IPO registration statements. I
find that management does build credibility with underwriters evidenced by IPO
registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily are associated with higher IPO offer prices.
The results suggest that registrants including voluntary ICW disclosures are more likely
to receive an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion. I find that registrants' voluntary ICW
disclosures are informative and are associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns
only when an auditor issues an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion after the disclosure.
IPO registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs and receive unqualified SOX 404 auditor
opinions appear to be successful in mitigating negative cumulative abnormal returns. My
findings provide evidence that misstatements appear to outpace material weakness
disclosures for the sample of IPO registrants. Overall, the findings suggest that managers
seek to build credibility through voluntary disclosure of ICWs at the IPO, allowing
managers to maximize the rewards at the IPO date (i.e., IPO offer price). However,
managers suffer punishment from investors if subsequent events (i.e., SOX 404 material
weaknesses) call into question the credibility of the disclosure. The post-IPO financial

reporting quality results are timely and relevant to regulators because the relationship
between misstatements and unqualified audit opinions is puzzling. Additionally, the
JOBS Act allows IPO registrants to delay SOX 404 compliance for up to five years.
Finally, this study’s results are important to investors because the purpose of SOX 404 is
to provide an advanced warning of financial reporting weaknesses.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines registrants’ incentives to reveal information on lower quality
financial reporting before public trading and their post initial public offering (IPO)
financial reporting quality. At the time of their IPO, registrants are not required to
comply with the internal control reporting requirements of either section 404(a) or 404(b)
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 404).1 The delayed compliance for registrants’
internal control assessments may increase the likelihood that internal control weaknesses
(ICWs) remain when IPOs begin publicly trading. However, some IPO registrants
voluntarily disclose information relating to internal controls before their public offering.
To date, there has been little research on the incentives IPO registrants have to disclose
this information or the effects of the disclosure. I examine whether management includes
voluntary ICW disclosures in their IPO registration statements to increase management’s
disclosure credibility before public trading. I also examine the association between
voluntary ICW disclosures and post-IPO financial reporting quality.
Understanding IPO registrants’ incentives to disclose ICWs and the effects of the
disclosure is important because market participants seeking information on the reliability
of IPO’s financial statements are likely to use managements’ voluntary disclosures
because IPO registrants lack a financial reporting history that comes with public trading.
I suggest that IPO registrants’ disclose ICWs voluntarily to increase management’s
disclosure credibility. Following Mercer (2004) disclosure credibility is defined as
“investors’ perceptions of the believability of a particular disclosure.” Disclosure

1

SOX section 404(a) requires management to evaluate internal controls and section 404(b) requires
auditors to evaluate internal controls .
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credibility reflects not only whether a disclosure is true or false, but also more broadly,
whether the disclosure of ICWs fairly represents the registrants’ internal control
assessment at the IPO date. Key factors to consider when assessing disclosure credibility
include management’s credibility, situational incentives at the disclosure date, the degree
of internal and external assurance, and characteristics of the disclosure itself (Mercer
2004). Because management voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration
statement, external assurance provided by the auditor cannot be examined. Thus, this
study focuses on management’s voluntary disclosures given the situational incentives for
IPO registrants.
Consistent with Mercer (2004), management’s disclosure credibility is defined as
“management’s perceived trustworthiness and competence in financial disclosure.” For
IPO registrants, management has not engaged in repeated interactions with investors.
Instead, management attempts to increase disclosure credibility to maximize rewards and
minimize punishments (Leary and Kowalski 1990). Thus, IPO management may
voluntarily disclose ICWs because it reveals management’s understanding of the risks in
the business and whether they are actively managing them (Deumes and Knechel 2008;
Barry and Brown 1986). Transparency regarding the financial reporting aspects that need
improvement helps IPO management increase their disclosure credibility associated with
voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statement.
Ex-ante, registrants have incentives to disclose ICWs voluntarily. The Securities
Act of 1933 holds liable all parties participating in the IPO registration for any material
misstatements or omissions in the registration statement. Thus, management has an
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incentive to build credibility with investors to avoid potential litigation costs (AshbaughSkaife, Collins, and Kinney 2007; Hermanson and Ye 2009; Basu, Krishnan, Lee, and
Zhang 2013). Prior research also suggests that bad news disclosures are inherently more
credible than good news disclosures (Mercer 2004; Hutton, Miller, and Skinner 2003;
Frost 1997; Williams 1996). Thus, voluntary ICW disclosures in an IPO registration
statement, arguably bad news, may be seen as more credible and have a positive effect on
managements’ disclosure credibility.
IPO management also has an incentive to build credibility with underwriters to
maximize the IPO offer price. Anecdotal evidence suggests that underwriters expect IPO
registrants to complete SOX 404 readiness assessments before pricing the IPO. Thus, if
management discloses ICWs in their IPO registration statements, underwriters likely
value the lower information asymmetry when assigning offer prices. Concurrent research
provides supporting evidence that voluntary disclosures of ICWs and related remediation
procedures are associated with less IPO underpricing (Basu et al. 2013). In contrast with
Basu et al. (2013) who examine investors’ perceptions of registrants’ intrinsic value (i.e.,
underpricing), this study examines the underwriters’ assessment of registrants’ offer
value.
Additionally, voluntary disclosures reduce information asymmetry between IPO
management and investors and reduces agency costs (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia
1991; Kanodia and Lee 1988; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001; Berger and Hann
2003; Bens and Monahan 2004; Basu et al. 2013). Voluntary disclosures indicate
management accepts a greater level of external monitoring which likely improves the
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relationship between management and investors. One scenario that can provide insights
on the trust built between management and investors is to examine the association
between voluntarily disclosed ICWs in IPO registration statements and the likelihood of
material weaknesses disclosed in registrants’ first SOX 404 auditor opinion and the
related market reaction. Prior literature suggests that resource constrained companies
(e.g., IPO registrants) are less likely to remediate internal control deficiencies (Bedard,
Hoitash, Hoitash, and Westermann 2012; Czerney 2015). Thus, voluntarily disclosed
ICWs may persist resulting in material weaknesses disclosed in registrants’ first SOX 404
auditor opinions. If management discloses ICWs in their IPO registration statements,
investors may reduce punishment when subsequent negative events (i.e., SOX 404
material weaknesses) occur because of the trust gained by managers through voluntary
ICW disclosures in the IPO registration statement. By disclosing ICWs the manager
informs investors about the business processes that need improvement. However,
voluntary earnings forecasts literature suggests investor responses are more pronounced
when bad news persists after an early warning (Rees and Sivaramakrishnan 2007).
Additionally, prior research finds an association between voluntary disclosure of nonmaterial ICWs and more negative abnormal returns; especially when the voluntary
disclosure occurs in the context of previous suspicious events (Kim and Park 2009).
Recent academic research suggests concerns about the reliability of SOX 404
reports for public companies, and whether the effectiveness of SOX 404 is a signal of
potential accounting problems (Rice and Weber 2012; Plumlee and Yohn 2010; Li and
Wang 2006). Examining a setting of IPOs and future misstatements offers the
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opportunity to investigate audit quality in the post-SOX era. A general audit quality
framework includes four components: inputs, processes, outputs and opinions, and audit
contexts (Francis 2011; Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith 2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014;
Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, and Velury 2013). I suggest that IPO registrants’
voluntarily disclosed ICWs are increased risks that auditors should consider when
performing subsequent audits. I examine whether ICWs disclosed at the IPO date lead to
misstatements within three years of the IPO date. Thus, I link audit quality to financial
reporting quality.
To investigate the incentives for voluntary disclosure and the consequences of the
disclosures, I identify IPO registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in their registration
statements. First, I examine the association between attempts to increase management’s
disclosure credibility and voluntary ICW disclosures. Prior studies investigating
management’s voluntary internal control disclosures before the passage of SOX 404
suggest that more credible companies (i.e., Fortune 100 companies) are more likely than
smaller companies (potentially less credible) to report on internal controls (Raghunandan
and Rama 1994; McMullen, Raghunandan, and Rama 1996). Second, I examine the
association between voluntary ICW disclosures and IPO offer prices to determine if
voluntary disclosure effects IPO offer prices. Third, I examine the association between
voluntary ICW disclosures and the likelihood of the identification of SOX 404 material
weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion. Fourth, I examine cumulative
abnormal returns during the three-day window surrounding the identification of SOX 404
material weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion to determine if early
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disclosure of ICWs builds credibility with investors. Finally, I examine the association
between voluntary ICW disclosures and post-IPO misstatements occurring within three
years of the IPO date.
Using a sample of IPO registration statements from 2005 to 2013, I find that IPO
registrants with a new CEO, who likely have the greatest incentive to increase their
management disclosure credibility, are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily. I also
find that underwriters assign higher prices to registrants disclosing ICWs suggesting that
attempts to increase disclosure credibility are successful in this context. My results
suggest that IPO registrants that are voluntarily disclosing ICWs are more likely to report
material weaknesses under SOX 404.
Additionally, I find negative abnormal returns for IPO registrants that voluntarily
disclosed ICWs and received adverse SOX 404 audit opinions. This result suggests that
attempts to establish disclosure credibility fail if remediation of disclosed ICWs does not
occur. On the other hand, IPO registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs but
subsequently remediated the control issue experienced abnormal returns that were not
different than those IPO registrants that did not disclose ICWs and received a clean SOX
404 audit opinion. Thus, the IPO registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily and remediate
those before SOX 404 compliance is mandatory appear to be successful in establishing
management’s disclosure credibility. Finally, the results suggest that the increased risks
associated with voluntary disclosure of internal control weaknesses are not adjusted for
by auditors when conducting subsequent audits. I also find that registrants whose auditor
opinion in the IPO registration statement includes an explanatory paragraph stating that
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the auditor did not audit internal controls over financial reporting are more likely to
misstate their financial statements in a year in which the internal control over financial
reporting opinion is unqualified. This finding suggests that the auditor does appear to
have knowledge about internal controls at the IPO date. However, the auditor does not
provide advanced warning of continued internal control deficiencies before the post-IPO
financial statement misstatements.
This study contributes to five streams of accounting literature. First, this study
adds to the research on the effects of SOX by evaluating the market reaction to SOX 404
material weakness disclosures when preceded by voluntary ICW disclosures. Current
research focusing on voluntary ICW disclosures uses SOX Section 302 disclosures to
investigate whether the information content of the disclosures increases with the severity
of the control weakness (Kim and Park 2009; Beneish, Billings, and Hodder 2008;
Hammersley, Myers, and Shakespeare 2008). Prior research suggests that the market
does not react to SOX 404 disclosures. However, the market does react to SOX 302
disclosures (Kim and Park 2009; Hammersley et al. 2008; Beneish et al. 2008; Franco,
Guan, and Lu 2005). Examining voluntary disclosure of ICWs in an IPO setting allows
examination of voluntary ICW disclosures that address the integrity of individual
registrants’ financial reporting processes before SOX 302 and SOX 404 ICW disclosures
are required.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on voluntary disclosures. Prior
research finds that voluntary management disclosures are useful in the evaluation of IPO
companies (Guo, Lev, Zhou 2004; Leone, Rock and Willenborg 2007; Schrand and
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Verrecchia 2002; Barth, Landsman, and Taylor 2014). This study extends the disclosure
literature by investigating the association between IPO registrants’ voluntary disclosures
and IPO offer prices. Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) call for examining a
combination of voluntary disclosures and mandatory disclosures. This study provides a
setting to examine voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements and
subsequent mandatory disclosures of SOX 404 material weaknesses jointly.
Third, this study contributes to the disclosure literature by providing evidence on
whether management’s attempts to increase their disclosure credibility by disclosing
ICWs results in benefits to the IPO. Given management’s incentive to build a reputation
with investors, understanding whether voluntary ICW disclosures help registrants
maximize rewards and minimize punishments is important.
Fourth, this study contributes to the debate on the relation between ICWs and
financial reporting quality. The internal control literature calls for using a range of
financial reporting quality proxies and examining the relation between ICWs and
financial reporting quality for the smaller company segment in the market (Schneider,
Gramling, Hermanson, and Ye 2009). I extend this line of research by using a sample of
IPO registrants and misstatements to measure financial reporting quality (DeFond and
Zhang 2014).
Fifth, this study contributes to the debate regarding whether SOX 404 is effective
in reducing future misstatements. My findings extend the misstatement literature with
evidence that voluntary ICW disclosures are not reliable signals of future misstatements.
The results suggest the auditing process was not adjusted for increased risk, proxied by
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the voluntary disclosure of ICWs or auditors including an explanatory paragraph
indicating no opinion on internal control over financial reporting is given. This result
complements the prior literature because IPO registrants provide a setting to examine the
auditing process and the subsequent output for the entire tenure as a public company.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes SOX
regulation, voluntary disclosure in the IPO setting, and develops the hypotheses. In
Chapter 3, I describe the research design and sample. Chapter 4 provides descriptive
statistics and the results of the analyses. In Chapter 5, I discuss additional analyses and
results. Chapter 6 provides the conclusion.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 SOX Regulation
Effective internal control over financial reporting improves management’s
disclosure credibility to the financial markets (Franzel 2015; PCAOB 2004; COSO
2006). The regulations regarding when and if IPO registrants must comply with SOX 404
have continued to evolve since the SOX 404 legislation enactment.2 Examining
voluntary disclosure of issues related to internal control over financial reporting offers a
setting to examine both the incentives to disclose before public trading and the
consequence of those disclosures after public trading requires mandatory disclosure. This

2

November 15, 2004 was the starting date for SOX 404 compliance for companies with market
capitalization greater than $75 million. July 15, 2005, was the starting date for SOX 404 compliance for
companies with a market capitalization less than $75 million. On September 25, 2010, the SEC
permanently exempted companies that are neither accelerated filers nor large accelerated filers from SOX
404. Approximately 4% of IPO registrants filing between January 1, 2005, and December 31, 2013 met the
permanent exemption requirements. On April 5, 2012, the SEC enacted the JOBS Act permitting EGC IPO
registrants to delay SOX 404 (b) compliance for up to five years.
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study examines management’s voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO registration
statements to understand whether these voluntary disclosures benefit IPO registrants.
The academic literature and regulators agree that to moderate investor skepticism
about disclosure credibility, internal control disclosures should be meaningful (i.e.,
companies do not fail to report deficiencies when internal controls are ineffective). 3
However, several commentators have questioned internal control reports’ disclosure
credibility because of apparent failures to identify ICWs (Whitehouse 2015; Glass Lewis
2007, IMA 2008, SEC 2009). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states, “a
central purpose of the assessment of internal control over financial reporting is to identify
material weaknesses that have, by their very definition, more than a remote likelihood of
leading to a material misstatement in the financial statements” (SEC 2005; Rice, Weber,
Wu 2014). The SOX 404 exemptions for IPO registrants are unusual because material
weakness disclosures are more informative for companies that are smaller and likely have
higher pre-disclosure information asymmetry (e.g., IPO registrants) and material
weakness disclosures are declining (Beneish et al. 2008; Whitehouse 2015).
While SOX 404 is intended to improve public companies’ information reliability,
compliance costs are often significant (COSO 2006; PCAOB 2004). The Jumpstart Our
Business Start-ups (JOBS) Act of 2012 was enacted on April 5, 2012, to ease the
transition from a private to a public company (SEC 2012). Title 1 of the JOBS Act allows
an exemption from compliance with SOX 404(b) for up to five years for those IPOs

The PCAOB asserts, “For the implementation of Section 404 of the Act to achieve its objectives, the
public must have confidence that all material weaknesses that exist as of the company’s year-end will be
publicly reported” (PCAOB 2004, paragraph 94).
3
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classified as emerging growth companies (EGC). Nearly all IPOs priced after April 5,
2012, utilized the JOBS Act accommodation to defer compliance with SOX 404(b)
(Latham and Watkins 2014). Approximately 25 percent of these EGCs voluntarily
disclosed a significant deficiency or material weakness in internal controls over financial
reporting (Latham and Watkins 2014). None of the EGCs that voluntarily disclosed a
significant deficiency or material weakness in internal controls over financial reporting
indicated an intention to comply with SOX 404 before the JOBS Act accommodation
expired (Latham and Watkins 2013). Market participants seeking insight into the current
and future internal control effectiveness of IPO registrants must rely on information other
than an explicit opinion from the auditor (Czerney 2015). Thus, it is not apparent why
delaying SOX 404 compliance for IPO registrants would not harm their financial
reporting quality. This study extends the literature on ICWs by examining IPO
registrants’ incentives to identify and disclose ICWs voluntarily when entering the
financial markets and the voluntary ICW disclosures’ effect on post-IPO financial
reporting quality.
2.2 Voluntary Disclosure – IPO Setting
SOX 404 requires communicating information to investors about weaknesses in
public companies’ systems of internal controls that may increase the likelihood of
financial statement errors. However, IPO registrants are not required to comply with
SOX 404 until the second annual report after the IPO. IPO management may include
voluntary disclosures in their IPO registration statements to increase management’s
disclosure credibility (Guo et al. 2004; Leone et al. 2007). The limited corporate
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information environment for IPO registrants inhibits external parties’ ability to judge the
reliability of management’s reported accounting numbers (Aharony, Lin, and Loeb 1993;
Friedlan 1994; Fan 2007). Thus, investors may use voluntary disclosure of ICWs to infer
management’s disclosure credibility.
2.3 Management’s Disclosure Credibility
Management’s credibility, characteristics of managements’ disclosures, and
situational incentives at the time of disclosure influence management’s disclosure
credibility. Social psychology research suggests an important factor in a message’s
credibility is the credibility of the messenger (Birnbaum and Stegner 1979). Williams
(1996) finds that managers can build disclosure reputations that increase the believability
of their subsequent disclosures. Experimental research also corroborates that
management’s credibility is important to disclosure credibility (Hirst, Koonce, and Miller
1999; Hodge, Hopkins, and Pratt 2006). IPO registrants do not have a financial reporting
history or repeated interactions with investors at the time of the IPO. Therefore, it is
likely crucial at least for some IPO management to establish credibility with financial
market participants.
At the most general level, management’s motive to establish credibility is the
maximization of expected rewards and minimization of expected punishments (Leary and
Kowalski 1990; Schlenker 1980). Schlenker (1980) proposed that people maximize their
reward-cost ratio dealing with others through self-presentation. People are motivated to
assert images with the highest potential value, although other factors also determine
people’s motivation to portray particular images (Schlenker 1980). I suggest that
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voluntary ICW disclosures in an IPO registration statement convey the impression that
management is aware of the financial reporting aspects that need improvement. Thus,
IPO management can increase the likelihood that they will obtain desired outcomes (e.g.,
maximize IPO offer price) and avoid undesired outcomes (e.g., Securities Act of 1933
litigation and negative investor reactions to post-IPO negative events) by using voluntary
ICW disclosures.
The characteristics of voluntary ICW disclosures also influence management’s
disclosure credibility. These characteristics include the ICW disclosures’ precision,
venue, and time horizon, whether supporting information accompanies the disclosure as
well as the inherent plausibility of the ICWs disclosed. Prior research provides evidence
on an association between disclosure credibility and increased precision (Hirst et al.
1999; Hassell, Jennings, and Lasser 1998; Baginski, Conrad, and Hassell 1993; King,
Pownall, and Waymire 1990). Mercer (2004) suggests that companies that operate in
uncertain environments gain credibility by conceding these uncertainties and providing
less precise forecasts. This acknowledgment of uncertainty suggests that disclosures that
conform to the underlying uncertainty are more credible than those that do not. I suggest
that disclosing ICW issues in the uncertain IPO environment acknowledges the
uncertainty in IPO financial statements and may increase the management’s disclosure
credibility.
Prior research also provides evidence that management credibility and supporting
information matter most when management has incentives to mislead (Mercer 2004).
When incentives to mislead are low, disclosures are inherently believable and other
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credibility enhancing mechanisms do not provide additional benefits (Mercer 2004).
Hutton et al. (2003) find that bad news disclosures are inherently more credible and do
not require supporting information to increase credibility. I suggest that voluntary ICW
disclosures in IPO registration statements are inherently bad news; therefore, including
these disclosures may also increase management’s disclosure credibility.
Finally, the inherent plausibility of the information disclosed can influence
management disclosure’s credibility. Prior literature suggests an association between
increased investor skepticism and information that deviates from prior expectations
(Koch 2002; Hansen and Noe 1998; Williams 1996; Koehler 1993; Jennings 1987). For
example, a disclosure that deviates significantly from investors’ expectations will be less
credible than one that does not. I suggest that voluntarily disclosing ICWs is more
credible because investors are more likely to believe that IPO registrants’ financial
reporting issues include internal control problems.
Studies that apply persuasion models to financial disclosures suggest that
situational incentives influence disclosure credibility (Hutton et al. 2003; Williams 1996;
McNichols 1989; Hassell et al. 1988). In the IPO context, IPO management has greater
incentives to provide good news rather than bad news disclosures. However, bad news
disclosures are expected to be more credible than good news disclosures (Mercer 2004).
Voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their registration statement is arguably a bad news
disclosure and thus, may improve investors’ perception that management is credible and
not misleading investors.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors and underwriters expect IPO registrants
to complete SOX 404 readiness assessments before pricing the IPO. Upon completion of
the SOX 404 readiness assessment, auditors and underwriters are likely to encourage
registrants to disclose any identified weaknesses to increase the transparency of the
registrants’ control environment and convey to the public that they are aware of the
financial reporting areas needing improvement. Thus, I expect IPO management is more
likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in IPO registration statements to increase disclosure
credibility. I formally state H1, in the alternative form, as follows:
H1: IPO registrants disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements
to increase management’s disclosure credibility.
2.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices
Prior IPO studies have primarily examined the underpricing phenomenon;
however, a few studies address the initial pricing of IPOs. Early pricing studies
investigated the association between financial information in the registration statement
and IPO offer prices (Klein 1996; Purnanandam and Swaminathan 2004; Beatty, Riffe,
and Thompson 2000; Loughran and Ritter 2004). Their findings suggest a positive
association between IPO offer prices and earnings per share, pro forma book value of
equity, the amount of equity retained by previous shareholders, the size of the
underwriting firm, auditor reputation, the net proceeds of the offering, the registrants’
age, and whether the offering consists of only stock.
Prior accounting research investigating information asymmetry and its related
effect on company valuations suggests an association between lower information
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asymmetry and higher valuations. Easley and O’Hara (2004) examine the discrepancies
between public information and private information and suggest that less informed
traders hold fewer assets because they realize they are disadvantaged. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1991) claim greater disclosure reduces the adverse price impact of large
trades, which, in an IPO registration setting, leads to increased demand and a higher IPO
valuation. Therefore, in this study’s context, investors who encounter less information
asymmetry should expect to pay more for the IPO. Thus, voluntarily disclosing ICWs
may increase IPO valuations by reducing information asymmetry in the IPO registration
process.
On the other hand, Roosenboom (2007) examines how underwriters value initial
public offerings and finds that underwriters consider discounted cash flow and dividend
discount models in the valuation process. His findings suggest that underwriters discount
IPO offer prices less when the registrants are forecasted to be relatively profitable in the
year of going public. IPO discounts are higher with increased risk and valuation
uncertainty. Voluntary ICW disclosures may signal increased risk, valuation uncertainty,
and affect profitability for more pervasive control problems often categorized as material
weaknesses. Thus, voluntarily disclosing ICWs may decrease IPO valuations because the
disclosed information signals potential negative consequences associated with cash flows
and profitability.
I suggest that IPO registrants have an incentive to disclose ICWs voluntarily to
improve disclosure credibility with underwriters. Underwriters certify that the IPO
offering price reflects both public and private information about the registrant.
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Underwriters risk reputation capital if they price offerings inappropriately, or market
participants subsequently conclude that the IPO registrant provided misleading
information (Beatty and Ritter 1986; Booth and Smith 1986; Menon and Williams 1991).
Because SOX does not require internal control reports for registrants, registrants
remaining silent regarding internal controls likely have greater information asymmetry
than registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs; increasing the likelihood that registrants
without internal control over financial reporting disclosures could be considered
mispriced. However, those ICWs voluntarily disclosed, especially those involving
material weaknesses, may reveal bad news associated with future profitability and cash
flows likely increasing the registrants’ risk profile with the underwriter. Given
competing arguments about the association between IPO offer prices and voluntary ICW
disclosures, I state H2, in the null form, as follows:
H2: There is no association between registrants’ voluntary ICWs disclosures and
IPO offer price.
2.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
Prior research after the passage of SOX 404 suggests public companies that
disclose ICWs prior to mandated internal control audits (e.g., in Form 8-K, SOX Section
302 certification) tend to be smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex,
resource constrained, and have more auditor turnovers (Krishnan 2005; Doyle, Ge,
McVay 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). Several studies present evidence that
companies are less likely to remediate ICWs because of resource constraints (Doyle et al.
2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Johnstone, Li, and Rupley 2011; Goh 2009; Chan,
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Kleinman, and Li 2009; Hammersley, Myers, and Zhou 2012). As IPO registrants
transition from going public to being public, the majority can be classified as resource
constrained. In a PricewaterhouseCoopers survey, 78% of survey respondents indicated
they hired between 1-5 new staff, to increase their SEC reporting capabilities
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2015).4 The PricewaterhouseCoopers survey results provide
evidence that after the IPO, registrants do not have adequate resources to meet SEC
reporting demands. Thus, based on prior studies and survey responses it is likely that a
positive association between voluntary disclosure of ICWs and post-IPO material
weaknesses exists.
Companies with significant financial reporting challenges are fruitful for internal
control weakness research (Scheider, Gramling, Hermanson, and Ye 2009). Prior
research provides evidence that companies failing to remediate material weaknesses have
an increased likelihood experiencing higher audit fees, receiving modified audit opinions
and going concern opinions, and more frequent auditor changes (Hammersley et al.
2012). Research examining material weaknesses and earnings quality suggests a positive
association between companies that invest in remediating material weaknesses and higher
earnings quality. Using the IPO setting is informative about whether voluntarily
disclosing deficient internal controls is an early warning of lower post-IPO financial
reporting quality because of the lack of resources (e.g., people and/or systems) often
required to fix control problems. I formally state H3, in the alternative form, as follows:

4

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP collaborated with Oxford Economics on a survey conducted from
September to December 2014 for US IPOs since 2012 (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2015).
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H3: Voluntary ICW disclosures are associated with a higher likelihood of postIPO SOX 404 material weaknesses.
2.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404
Material Weaknesses
Voluntarily disclosing ICWs in IPO registration statements potentially builds trust
between management and investors because the voluntary disclosure signals that
management is willing to accept a greater level of external monitoring. The majority of
research on voluntary disclosure of ICWs establishes an association between SOX 302
material weakness disclosures and a higher cost of equity capital (Cassell, Myers, Zhou
2013; Kim and Park 2009; Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and Kinney
2009). These studies focus on companies that have less uncertainty about their financial
reporting credibility because the majority of companies were releasing audited financial
statements publicly before SOX. This study extends the prior literature by includ ing IPO
registrants’ voluntary disclosure of ICWs before required compliance with SOX 302 or
SOX 404. Examining voluntary disclosure of ICWs in this setting is particularly
informative because there is no requirement for internal control opinions for IPO
registrants’ as of the registration date. (Beatty 1989; Menon and Williams 1991;
Willenborg 1999).
IPO management can choose to disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement to
reduce uncertainty. Prior research indicates that investors are uncertain about
management’s private information and thus they cannot infer from silence that
management is withholding negative news (Dye 1985). However, bad news will be
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disclosed when the costs of disclosure are low enough or when the uncertainty is high
because reducing that uncertainty should benefit the IPO registrant. Managers also incur
reputational costs if they fail to disclose negative news promptly (Skinner 1997, 1994). I
suggest there is an association between voluntarily disclosing ICWs and management’s
attempts to increase their disclosure credibility. Thus, IPO management alerts the
financial markets of their ICWs upon identification rather than incurring the costs of
remaining silent until required compliance.
The post-IPO negative event I examine is the identification of SOX 404 material
weaknesses in the first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion. Given that companies are
more likely to disclose voluntarily when the disclosure benefits exceed the costs,
investors may not react to registrants disclosing SOX 404 material weaknesses in their
first post-IPO SOX 404 auditor opinion because investors perceive management as more
credible for voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statements. Thus,
management reduces future investor punishment by establishing credibility before the
bad news was released. I formally state H4, in the null form, as follows:
H4: There is no association between voluntary ICW disclosures and a subsequent
market response to negative events.
2.7 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements
Prior literature suggests that companies with reported ICWs are more likely to
have subsequent misstatements (Li and Wang 2006; Nagy 2010; Feng and Li 2010). Li
and Wang (2006) find that subsequent misstatements from companies receiving adverse
internal control over financial reporting opinions have larger net income effects and
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involve more financial statement accounts. Nagy (2010) provides evidence that
companies disclosing an internal control material weakness in the previous period are
more likely to misstate financial statements in the current period. Feng and Li (2010)
suggest SOX 404 enables companies to prevent and detect material misstatements in
financial reports in a more timely manner. Additionally, ICWs in specific accounts are
positively associated with misstatements in those accounts (Feng and Li 2010).
However, the reliability of SOX 404 reports has been questioned, and the
effectiveness of SOX 404 in providing a warning of potential accounting problems
remains unclear. For example, the SEC has suggested that the recent decline in reported
control weaknesses “could be due to material weaknesses not being identified or
reported,” as opposed to improvements in the underlying controls (SEC 2009;
Whitehouse 2009, 2010, 2015; Rice, Weber, Wu 2014). Practitioners are also concerned
about the robustness of enforcement, noting that the SEC eliminated its accounting fraud
task force in a recent reorganization (e.g., McKenna 2012).5
Recent evidence from academic research highlights similar concerns. Rice and
Weber (2012) study a sample of companies with misstatements stemming from
underlying ICWs and find that the majority of these companies do not report their
weaknesses before the related misstatements. Thus, in many cases, financial statement
users are not provided an early warning of the possibility of a material misstatement in
the financial statements until after the announcement of such a misstatement.

For example, Jack Ciesielski, owner of research firm R.G. Associates and publisher of The Analyst’s
Accounting Observer, is quoted in McKenna (2012, 46) arguing, “SEC enforcement of Sarbanes -Oxley has
been minimal. Sarbanes-Oxley may have brought us some peace for our time, but without vigilance
through long-term enforcement, it can’t last.”
5
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Additionally, restatements have outpaced reported ICWs in recent years implying that
many weaknesses likely go unreported (Plumlee and Yohn 2010).
2.8 Audit Quality Link to Financial Reporting Quality
The unresolved question of why financial statement restatements outpace reported
material weaknesses is an intense focus of regulators today. The entire objective of
internal control reporting under SOX 404 remains unachieved after a post-enactment
decade.6 As a result, regulators are seeking changes in guidance and standards. For
example, the PCAOB recently unveiled a Concept Release on Audit Quality Indicators
and it includes financial statement restatements as an indicator (Hanson 2015). A survey
of audit partners and investors also confirms that financial statement restatements for
errors are a leading indicator of audit quality linked to financial reporting quality
(Christensen, Glover, Omer, and Shelley 2015).
Regulators and academics agree that audit quality includes many dimensions such
as inputs, processes, outputs and opinions, and post-opinion (Francis 2011; Bedard et al.
2010; DeFond and Zhang 2014; Knechel et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). I suggest
that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in an IPO registration statement becomes an audit risk
that auditors should consider when performing subsequent audits. Thus, voluntarily
disclosed ICWs in an IPO registration statement should be part of subsequent audit
processes (e.g., implementation of audit tests by engagement teams) (Francis 2011). This
study offers a rare setting for examining the subsequent audit processes for IPO

”The whole point was to provide information in advance of any financial restatement,” says Joe Carcello,
executive director of the corporate governance center at the University of Tennessee. “If investors never get
information in advance, it’s not exactly clear what the point of it is.” (W hitehouse 2015).
6
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registrants. Using subsequent misstatements for IPO registrants completes the audit
quality analysis. This dataset allows one to gain further insight into audit quality because
material weaknesses and misstatements are available for the entire tenure of IPO
registrants.
This study is relevant to those regulators and academics’ concerns that companies
are not disclosing internal control material weaknesses. From 2010-2014, the percentage
of clean internal control opinions preceding financial statement restatements rose from
74.2% in 2010 to 80.4% in 2014 (Whitehouse 2015). 7 Anecdotal evidence supports the
notion that it is difficult for auditors to convince an audit client that a material weakness
exists in the absence of a material misstatement (Franzel 2015). Thus, financial reporting
quality, measured by financial statement misstatements, appears to relate to the output
dimension of audit quality. I formally state H5, in the null form, as follows:
H5: Voluntary ICW disclosures are not associated with the likelihood of post-IPO
misstatements.
CHAPTER 3. MEASURES AND MODELS
3.1 Management’s Disclosure Credibility Measures
CEOs are often the central strategic decision maker and are assumed to have the
greatest influence over discretionary choices (Barker and Mueller 2002). I suggest that
new CEOs at the time of the IPO are more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures to
increase their disclosure credibility. On the other hand, prior research indicates long-

“There are a lot of analytics there to suggest that companies are not discussing or acknowledging
weaknesses, but instead are relying on the fact that there are no material misstatements, so therefore
controls are fine,” says Pat Voll, vice president at financial reporting consulting firm RoseRyan. “That’s
not an appropriate conclusion.” (Whitehouse 2015).
7

24
tenured CEOs lose touch with their firms’ environments and may not make changes to
improve the company over time (Miller 1991). Other studies suggest that founder/longtenured CEOs are more likely concerned with ownership dilution and control issues than
financial reporting problems (Jain and Tabak 2008). Thus, long-tenured CEOs may not
voluntarily disclose ICWs because they are not concerned about improving financial
reporting. On the other hand, new CEOs likely have greater incentives to improve their
disclosure credibility to establish their knowledge of company problems with financial
reporting.
CEO age is also likely associated with the incentive to establish disclosure
credibility (Kim, Bateman, Gilbreath, and Andersson 2009). Older CEOs tend to be
more conservative and risk averse (Barker and Mueller 2002; Hambrick and Mason
1984). I suggest that conservatism and risk aversion increase the likelihood that older
CEOs will disclose ICWs voluntarily. The Securities Act of 1993 Section 11 provides
some of that incentive because it allows investors to initiate lawsuits against registrants,
underwriters, or auditors when the stock price is below the offer price because of
omissions of material information in the registration statement. Thus, older CEOs are
more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures to reduce personal risks associated with
the IPO registration.
3.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives
To test H1, I estimate a logistic model to examine the association between
voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements and incentives to increase
disclosure. The logit model is as follows:
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ICW_REGISTRANT = β0 + β1 NEWCEO + β2 CEOAGE + β3 LN_MV + β4 LIT +
β5 LN_TA + β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 VC_BACKED + β9 PE_BACKED +
β10 CARVEOUT + β11 NASDAQ + β12 GC + β13 REST_REGISTRANT +
β14 LN_BUSSEG + β15 FOREIGN + β16 GDWLIP + β17 WDP + β18 AUDITOR_CHG +
ε
(1)
where ICW_REGISTRANT, the dependent variable in equation (1), is an indicator
variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any
deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control
deficiency) in its registration statement.
My variables of interest are NEWCEO and CEOAGE. The NEWCEO and
CEOAGE are proxies for management credibility. NEWCEO is an indicator variable
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO tenure at the IPO date is zero years, and I
expect a positive coefficient for NEWCEO. Prior studies suggest that founder CEOs tend
to be more concerned about ownership dilution and control issues than financial reporting
issues in IPO transactions which likely reduces their credibility (Jain and Tabek 2008).
Thus, companies typically hire new CEOs in IPO transactions (Bruton, Fried, and Hisrich
1997; Bruton, Fried, and Hisrich 2000; Fried and Hisrich 1995; Jain and Tabek 2008).
CEOAGE is the CEO’s age at the IPO date. Prior research suggests age is correlated
with top management credibility (Kim et al. 2009). I expect a positive coefficient because
prior research suggests older CEOs are more conservative and risk-averse (Bantel and
Jackson 1989; Barker and Mueller 2002; Child 1974; Hambrick and Mason 1984; Joos,
Leone, and Zimmerman 2003; Jain and Tabek 2008). Thus, older CEOs are more likely
to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.
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The LN_MV and LIT are proxies for litigation risk. LN_MV is the logarithmic
transformation of the pre-IPO market value of equity. Venkataraman, Weber, and
Willenborg (2008) suggest higher proceeds indicate greater risk exposure, and I expect a
positive coefficient. Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), LIT is an indicator
variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is in a high litigation risk
industry. I define high litigation risk industries following Venkataraman et al. (2008),
and I expect a positive coefficient.
The control variables include other registrant characteristics likely associated with
the disclosure of ICWs. LN_TA is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total
assets. I expect a negative coefficient on because larger companies are more likely to
have more financial reporting processes and procedures in place. Larger companies are
also more likely to have an adequate number of employees to ensure proper segregation
of duties (Czerney 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005).
LN_AGE is the logarithmic transformation of the registrant age. A negative coefficient
is expected based on the notion that older IPO registrants have stronger internal controls
(Doyle et al. 2007). Registrants with pre-tax goodwill impairments (GDWLIP) and other
pre-tax write-downs (WDP) are more likely to have internal control weaknesses (Doyle et
al. 2007). Thus, I expect positive coefficients on GDWLIP and WDP. To control
registrants’ complexity, I include the following controls: the logarithmic transformation
of the total number of business segments (LN_BUSSEG) and a foreign operations
indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has foreign operations
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(FOREIGN). I expect a positive coefficient for both complexity proxies (Goh 2009; Rice
and Weber 2012).
The IPO registrants’ auditors and other capital providers are likely to have
incentives to encourage the registrant to disclose ICWs noted in the IPO registration
statement process. Prior research suggests external auditors, especially Big 4 auditors,
have strong incentives to avoid potential litigation and reputational loss (Beatty 1989;
Beatty and Welch 1996; Hogan 1997; Mayhew and Wilkins 2003; Lou and Vasvari
2013). I include an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has a Big
N auditor and expect a positive coefficient for BIGN because IPO registrants may be
pressured to disclose ICWs identified by their external auditor. I include an indicator
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has changed auditors since the prior
audited financial statement date and expect a positive coefficient for AUDITOR_CHG
because IPO registrants with recent auditor changes are more likely to report ICWs
(Hermanson, Krishnan, and Ye 2009; Rice and Weber 2012). Venture capitalists are also
closely involved in IPO registration statement process and monitor the IPO registrants
they have backed (Gompers and Lerner 2004). Thus, I include an indicator equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if a registrant has venture capital backing and expect a positive
coefficient for VC_BACKED. Private equity firms take an active role in monitoring the
IPO registrants that they supply capital (Gompers and Lerner 2000). PE_BACKED is an
indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant has private equity backing. I
expect a positive coefficient for PE_BACKED. A sponsored spin-off is a company
carved out of an established organization and often the former parent will retain partial
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ownership in the new registrant (Wallin and Dahlstrand 2006). I suggest the partial
ownership interests generate additional monitoring of the IPO registrant. Thus, I include
CARVEOUT an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is a spinoff
from another public company. I expect a positive coefficient.
Willenborg and McKeown (2001) report that many registrants issue shares to the
public despite having received going-concern opinions from their auditors. Registrants
with going-concern issues are likely subject to higher litigation risk and, therefore, are
more likely to disclose ICWs. I include GC an indicator equal to one (and zero otherwise)
if the registrant received a going concern audit opinion in the IPO registration statement
to control for the differences between registrants with and without going-concern issues.
Additionally, I include an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant lists on the NASDAQ exchange, NASDAQ. Another indication of ineffective
financial reporting is the occurrence of accounting restatements (Kinney and McDaniel
1989; PCAOB 2007). Thus, I include REST_REGISTRANT an indicator equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant restated financial statements in the IPO registration
statement. I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels after
merging data, calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a
summary of all variables.
3.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices
I examine the association between registrants’ IPO offer prices and voluntary
ICWs disclosures to test H2. To test the relation, I use the following OLS model:
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LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW + β2 EPS + β3 BV + β4 NET_PROCEEDS +
β5 UW_SHARE + β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 LIT + β9 NEWCEO + β10 CEOAGE
+ YearFE + ε
(2)
where LN_IPO_PRICE, the dependent variable in equation (2), is the logarithmic
transformation of the IPO offer price. I choose the IPO offer price because I investigate
whether voluntary ICWs disclosures in the IPO registration statement builds credibility
with underwriters, who determine the IPO offer price. The variables of interest ICW is
one of the four following ICW disclosure measures: ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY,
SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY. ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls
(material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration
statement. MW_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one material weakness in its registration
statement. SD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one significant deficiency in its registration
statement. CD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant voluntarily disclosed, at least, one control deficiency in its registration
statement.
The prior literature suggests positive associations between profitability and the
book value of equity provided in IPO registrants’ prospectuses and IPO pricing (Klein
1996; Beatty et al. 2000). Thus, I include control variables for registrants’ pre-offering
earnings per share (EPS) and pre-offering book value of equity (BV). Prior research
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suggests a positive association between the proportion of proceeds retained by the issuer
and IPO pricing (Beatty et al. 2000); therefore, I include NET_PROCEEDS in the model.
Prior research also suggests a positive association between the proportion of
underwriters’ market share of IPO proceeds underwritten and IPO pricing (Beatty et al.
2000); therefore, I include the control variable UW_SHARE. Additionally, I control for
BIGN and LN_ AGE because prior research suggests that IPO offer prices are associated
with information in the prospectus and risk (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000; Menon and
Williams 1991; Loughran and Ritter 2004; Beatty and Ritter 1986). Prior research
suggests operating in high litigation industries is associated with lower IPO offer prices
(Klein 1996); therefore, I expect a negative coefficient for LIT. I do not predict a sign on
the coefficient for NEWCEO or CEOAGE because it is not clear whether CEO attributes
affect IPO pricing. Year fixed effects are included to control for cross-sectional variation
in IPO offer prices over the sample period. I again winsorize all additional continuous
variables at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, calculating lag values,
and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.
3.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
To test H3, I use a Firth logistic model to estimate an increased likelihood of
auditor-reported material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting when
IPO registrants voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements (Firth
1993). The logistic model is as follows:
ICW_404 = β0 + β1 ICW_ REGISTRANT + β2 LN_TA + β3 LACK_RESOURCES +
β4 LN_BUSSEG + β5 LOSS + β6 CR + β7 INVREC + β8 Z + β9 BIGN + β10 DIFF_AUD +
β11 LN_AGE + β12 AU9550 + β13 FOREIGN + β14 REST_REGISTRANT +
β14 LN_FEES + β16 NAS + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε
(3)
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where ICW_404, the dependent variable in equation (3), is an indicator variable equal to
one (and zero otherwise) if the company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their
first SOX 404 report. The variable of interest is ICW_REGISTRANT, an indicator
variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any
deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control
deficiency) in its registration statement.
Prior research suggests that determinants of ICW disclosures and subsequent
remediation are registrant size, resource constraints, complexity, and financial distress
(Bedard et al. 2012; Hammersley et al. 2012; Johnstone et al. 2011; Goh 2009; Chan et
al. 2009; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). Registrant size
is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total assets LN_TA, and a negative
coefficient is expected on LN_TA based on prior research (Czerney 2015; AshbaughSkaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005). I include an indicator variable
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant discloses an ICW in its IPO registration
statement related to insufficient personnel with the appropriate level of knowledge,
experience, and training, LACK_RESOURCES. I do not predict a sign for the
coefficient. An additional measure of resource constraints is the age of the IPO
registrant, proxied by LN_AGE. A negative coefficient is expected based on the notion
that longer-tenured IPO registrants have stronger internal controls (Doyle et al. 2007).
The proxies for registrant complexity are the logarithmic transformation of the total
number of business segments LN_BUSSEG, a foreign operations indicator FOREIGN,
and an indicator for restated financial statements in the IPO registration statement
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REST_REGISTRANT. Following prior research, I expect positive coefficients for all
three complexity measures (Johnstone et al. 2011; Goh 2009; Rice and Weber 2012).
Financial health is measured using an indicator variable that equals one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant reports a net loss LOSS, the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities CR, the ratio of the sum of inventory and receivables to total assets INVREC,
and the Altman (2000) financial distress measure Z. Prior research supports expecting a
negative coefficient for CR and Z and a positive coefficient for LOSS and INVREC
(Czerney 2015; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007).
I include controls for the auditor’s ability to identify and issue an adverse internal
control over financial reporting opinion. BIGN equals one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant has a Big N auditor. DIFF_AUD is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the auditor changed since the IPO. Following prior research, I expect a
positive coefficient on the auditor change measure (Czerney 2015; Rice and Weber
2012). Auditors are not required to opine on internal controls in IPO registration
statements. However, some auditor opinions include an explanatory paragraph stating
that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial reporting, and
accordingly does not express an opinion. Therefore, an indicator equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section 9550 that states the
auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over
financial reporting (AU9550) is included as a control. I expect a positive coefficient
(Czerney 2015). To control for any potential economic bonding and auditor effort, I
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include controls for the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees (NAS) and the logarithmic
transformation of the total audit fees LN_FEES. The coefficients on NAS and LNFEES
are expected to be negative and positive, respectively (Czerney 2015; Rice and Weber
2012).
The model includes year and industry fixed effects to control for cross-sectional
variation in material weaknesses reported over time and across industries. All continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data,
calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all
variables.
3.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404
Material Weaknesses
To test H4, I examine differential investor response to the release of the first SOX
404 auditor opinion after the IPO. I consider cumulative abnormal returns to earnings
announcements using the following OLS model, modified from Kim and Park (2009):
CAR (-1, 1) = β0 + β1 VICW_CLEAN + β2 SILENT_ADVERSE +
β3 VICW_ADVERSE + β4 LN_TA + β5 BM + β6 ACCEL + β7 LEV + β8 BHR
+β9 BIGN + β10 LN_GEOSEG + + β11 FOREIGN + β12 SALES_GROWTH +
β13 INVT + β14 LOSS +β15 LN_AGE + β16 UE + β17 DIFF_AUD + YearFE +
IndustryFE + ε
(4)
where CAR (-1,1), the dependent variable in equation (4), is the market-adjusted
cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day
0 is the filing date of the second annual report including the first internal control over
financial reporting opinion. The variables of interest are VICW_CLEAN,
SILENT_ADVERSE, and VICW_ADVERSE. VICW_CLEAN is an indicator variable

34
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient
internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its
registration statement and received an unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion in its second
annual report. SILENT_ADVERSE is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant did not voluntarily disclose any deficient internal controls in
its registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second
annual report. VICW_ADVERSE is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second
annual report.
Following Kim and Park (2009), I control for the book value of equity to market
value of equity ratio, BM. ACCEL is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant is an accelerated filer (market value of equity > $75 million).
Registrants with ICWs tend to be less profitable, smaller, younger, more complex, or
growing rapidly (e.g., Ge and McVay 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al.
2007). Accordingly, I include an indicator for companies that report a net loss LOSS and
the ratio of total debt to assets LEV to control for profitability. I include the logarithmic
transformation of total assets LN_TA to control for company size. Additionally, I
include the logarithmic transformation of the company’s age LN_AGE. I include the
logarithmic transformation of the total number of geographic segments LN_GEOSEG
and a foreign operations indicator FOREIGN to control for complexity. I include an
indicator variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrants’ sales growth is
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in the top quintile SALES_GROWTH and the ratio of inventory to total assets INVT to
control for growth.
I include a BIGN indicator to control for auditors’ ability to identify an adverse
internal control over financial reporting opinion. I include the variables BHR and UE to
control for information released contemporaneously with SOX 404 auditor opinions.
BHR is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the buy-and-hold
market adjusted return over the 120 days before the SOX 404 auditor opinion (i.e., from
day -120 to -1) is less than zero. Unexpected earnings UE is calculated as reported IBES
earnings minus the median consensus analyst EPS forecast, deflated by stock price.
DIFF_AUD is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the auditor
changed since the IPO. I make no prediction for BM, LN_GEOSEG, FOREIGN,
SALES_GROWTH, LOSS, LEV, INVT, BHR, UE, and DIFF_AUD. The model
includes year and industry fixed effects to control for cross-sectional variation in material
weaknesses reported over time and across industries. I winsorize all continuous variables
at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data, calculating lag values, and
scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.
3.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements
To test H5, I estimate a logistic model to examine whether registrants’ post-IPO
financial reporting quality is associated with voluntarily disclosed ICWs in the IPO
registration statement. The logistic model is as follows:
DRFQ = β0 + β1 LN_TA + β2 LN_BUSSEG + β3 NEG_ROA + β4 CR + β5 INVREC +
β6 Z + β7 BIGN + β8 AUDITOR_CHG + β9 LIT + β10 AU9550 + β11 LN_AGE +
β12 FOREIGN + β13 AS5_404 + β14 BODSIZE + β15 DUALCEO +β16 NAS + ε
(5)
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where DRFQ, the dependent variable in equation (5), is categorical and has four different
groups. The base group is registrants that report no indicators of degrading financial
reporting quality (i.e., no ICWs or misstatements). Thus, the base group is registrants that
do not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, have an unqualified
internal control opinion, and report no post-IPO misstatements. The VICW group is
registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, have an
unqualified internal control opinion, and do not have a corresponding misstatement for
the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting opinion. The
VICW_REST group is registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration
statement, have an unqualified internal control opinion, and have a corresponding
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting
opinion. The REST group is registrants that do not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO
registration statement, have an unqualified internal control opinion, and have a
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial
reporting opinion. Table 1 summarizes the groups.

8

[INSERT TABLE 1]
Prior literature indicates that registrant characteristics may influence the
likelihood of ICW disclosures and subsequent misstatements. LN_TA controls for

8

IPO registrants that did report internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 are removed from
the sample because those outcome groups have inadequate cell counts (Garson 2012). Fifteen observations
reported internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 only. Nineteen observations reported
internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404 and misstated their financial statements. Fifteen
observations voluntarily disclosed internal control deficiencies in their IPO registration statements and
reported internal control deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404. Eighteen observations voluntarily
disclosed internal control deficiencies in their IPO registration statements, reported internal control
deficiencies in accordance with SOX 404, and misstated their financial statements.
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registrant size and is measured using the logarithmic transformation of total assets. A
prediction is not made for the LN_TA coefficient because prior research provides mixed
results on the association between company size and misstatements (Cao, Myers, Omer
2012). I include two proxies for registrant complexity; the logarithmic transformation of
the total number of business segments (LN_BUSSEG) and a foreign operations indicator
(FOREIGN). Evidence from prior studies supports companies’ complexity being
negatively associated with financial reporting quality (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al.
2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Goh 2009; Johnstone et al. 2011; Rice and Weber
2012). Following prior studies, I expect positive coefficients for both complexity
measures. I include four financial health proxies. The proxies are an indicator variable
that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant reports a negative return on assets
NEG_ROA, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities CR, the ratio of the sum of
inventory and receivables to total assets INVREC, and the Altman (2000) financial
distress measure Z. Prior research predicts negative coefficients for CR and Z and
positive coefficients for NEG_ROA and INVREC (Czerney 2015; Cao et al. 2012;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Summers and Sweeney 1998). Prior
literature finds a negative association between misstatements and company age,
suggesting younger companies have less mature financial reporting structures (Doyle et
al. 2007). Thus, the logarithmic transformation of a company’s age, LN_AGE, is
included, and a negative coefficient is expected.
I include indicators for BIGN, AUDITOR_CHG, AU9550, and AS5_404 to
control for the auditors’ characteristics. I expect a negative coefficient for BIGN and a
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positive coefficient for AUDITOR_CHG (Rice and Weber 2012). AU9550 controls for
an IPO registration statement’s auditor opinion with non-standard language in accordance
with AU Section 9550. In this context, the auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion
on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting. AS5_404 controls for
having an auditor opinion issued after the passage of Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5). I
do not predict signs for the coefficients AU9550 or AS5_404. I also include the ratio of
non-audit fees to total fees (NAS) to control for the association between financial
reporting quality and non-audit fees. The extant evidence is largely mixed, thus, I do not
predict a sign for the coefficient on NAS (Cao et al. 2012; Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz
2004; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Maydew 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Frankel,
Johnson, and Nelson 2002).
I control for total number of members on the board of directors (BODSIZE) and
for CEOs who are the board chair (DUALCEO) because these two basic board
characteristics are commonly used to proxy for the strength of corporate governance.
Consistent with prior literature, I expect positive coefficients for BODSIZE and
DUALCEO (Cao et al. 2012; Yermack 1996; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996).
Consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007), I control for heightened litigation risk
using an indicator variable that equals one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant is in a
high litigation risk industry LIT. I define high litigation risk industries consistent with
Venkataraman et al. (2008) and I predict a sign on the coefficient. I winsorize all
continuous variables at the 1 percent, and 99 percent levels after merging data,
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calculating lag values, and scaling variables. Appendix B provides a summary of all
variables.
3.7 Sample
I obtain a sample of IPO registrants from January 1, 2005, to December 31, 2013,
and use data from the Audit Analytics, BoardEx, and Compustat databases and
supplemental manual screening of the IPO registration statements. The sample period
begins on January 1, 2005, because all public companies, regardless of market
capitalization, were required to comply with SOX 404 during 2005. The sample period
ends on December 31, 2013, because this is the latest data available. The sample
includes registrants that originally file their registration statement with the SEC on form
S-1 or F-1. To identify registrants that voluntarily disclosed ICWs and included restated
financial statements within their IPO registration statements, I manually screen the risk
factors, management’s discussion and analysis, and audited financial statements sections
of IPO registration statements. Refer to Appendix A for examples of voluntary ICW
disclosures from IPO companies in this sample. Consistent with prior IPO research, unit
offerings, closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, and American depository
receipts are excluded. I begin with an available sample of 1,215 IPO registrants for my
multivariate analyses. The sample I use to examine H1 is 608 registrants because 188
registrants do not have the necessary Compustat data and 419 registrants do not have
CEO data in BoardEx. I use a sample of 590 registrants to examine H2; I eliminate 18
registrants from the sample used to test H1 because they do not have the data necessary in
Compustat to test H2. The sample I use to examine H3 is 785 registrants because 111
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registrants do not have the necessary Compustat data and 73 registrants lack the
necessary Audit Analytics data. The sample size used to test H4 is 517 registrants
because 113 registrants lack the necessary Audit Analytics data, 159 registrants lack the
necessary data to compute cumulative abnormal returns, 242 registrants lack the
necessary IBES data, seven registrants lack the necessary Compustat data, and four
registrants disclose different ICWs in their IPO and adverse SOX 404 auditor opinions. I
delete the registrants that disclose different ICWs in their IPO and adverse SOX 404
auditor opinions because I want to determine if the market reactions are related to
persistent ICWs. I use a sample of 635 registrants to test H5 because 181 registrants lack
the necessary Compustat data, 324 registrants had subsequent misstatements more than
three years after the IPO, 67 registrants had SOX 404 material weaknesses related to the
same year of the misstatement, and 100 registrants lack the necessary BoardEx data. I
delete misstatements if they affect periods that begin more than three years after the IPO
because the Securities Act of 1933 litigation window expires three years after the IPO
date.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
3.8 Entropy Balancing Adjustment
I use entropy balancing to create a balanced sample of IPO registrants that
voluntarily disclosed ICWs and those that did not. Unlike matching based on propensity
scores, entropy balancing directly calculates weights to adjust for known sample
distributions, integrating covariate balance directly into the weights assigned to control
observations (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013). Entropy balancing employs
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a maximum-entropy reweighting scheme to create a set of weights such that the treatment
and reweighted control samples satisfy constraints that balance the three moments of the
distribution of treatment firms with control firms on a large set of covariates. The
improved balance in covariate distributions and maximum retention of sample size, in
particular, treatment firms are the method’s principal advantages. Balance is assessed
individually or jointly on mean, variance, and skewness of selected covariates and the
procedure can be set to iterate repeatedly until the variance of the weights cannot be
reduced further without undermining the balance constraints.
Application of the entropy balance weights to the control sample results in more
weight being given to under-represented groups and less weight to over-represented
groups, adjusting for unequal probability of sample selection and creates a “pseudopopulation” with characteristics in line with the treatment sample. I use an entropybalanced sample adjusted for differences in the first moment (mean) of the covariate
distributions to examine H2 because the model does not converge when balancing on the
second and third moments. I use an entropy-balanced sample adjusted for differences in
the first (mean) and second (variance) moments of the covariate distributions to examine
H4 because the model does not converge when balancing on the third moment.
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the sample population. Table 3 Panel A
identifies the distribution of the sample by industry (17 Fama-French industry
classification) (Fama and French 1997) to test the five hypotheses. The largest industry
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group is Other in the samples to test each of the five hypotheses. Table 3 Panel B presents
the distribution of the sample by year for the voluntary disclosure of ICWs incentives
sample. Table 2 Panel C presents the distribution of the sample by year for the IPO offer
price sample. Table 3 Panel D presents the distribution of the sample by year for the
SOX 404 material weaknesses sample. Table 3 Panel E presents the sample distribution
by year for the SOX 404 material weaknesses market reaction sample. Table 3 Panel F
presents the distribution of the sample by year for the subsequent misstatement sample.
Table 3 Panels B-F indicate lower IPO activity in 2008 and 2009 coinciding with the
financial crisis.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent
variables. In the pooled voluntary disclosure of ICWs incentives sample (Panel A), 27
percent of the registrants voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration
statements ICW_REGISTRANT. The percentage of observations that hired a new CEO
at the IPO date is 60 percent, and the mean (median) CEO age at the IPO date is 50.06
(50.00) years, respectively. Approximately 43 percent of IPO registrants operate in high
litigation industries LIT, and the mean (median) of LN_MV is 19.87 (19.79),
respectively. On average, 13 percent of IPO registrants include restated financial
statements in their registration statement REST_REGISTRANT. The mean (median) of
LN_AGE, at the IPO date, is 2.24 (2.20) years, respectively. The majority of IPO
registrants engage BIGN auditors, and the mean (median) of LN_TA is 5.20 (4.99),
respectively.
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In the entropy balanced IPO offer price sample (Panel B), the mean (median) IPO
price is $15.03 ($14.00), respectively. Approximately 26 percent of the registrants
voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration statements ICW_REGISTRANT.
The mean (median) portion of NET_PROCEEDS retained by the registrant is 0.79 (0.93),
respectively. The mean (median) underwriter share of IPO proceeds underwritten,
UW_SHARE, is 0.08 (0.05), respectively.
In the pooled SOX 404 material weaknesses sample (Panel C), 32 percent of the
registrants voluntarily disclosed an ICW in their IPO registration statements
ICW_REGISTRANT. The percentage of observations that recorded a LOSS is 37
percent and the mean (median) registrant age at the first SOX 404 auditor opinion date is
2.06 (2.08) years, respectively. Approximately 46 percent of IPO registrants operate in
high litigation industries LIT. On average, 55 percent of IPO registrants have foreign
operations FOREIGN. The mean (median) of LN_TA, at the first SOX 404 auditor
opinion date, is 5.91 (5.79), respectively. The majority of IPO registrants engage BIGN
auditors, and the approximately 63 percent of auditor opinions include an explanatory
paragraph stating that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial
reporting, and accordingly does not express an opinion, AU9550.
In the entropy balanced cumulative abnormal returns sample (Panel D), 27
percent of the registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements
and had unqualified SOX 404 opinions VICW_CLEAN. Approximately two percent of
registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements and had
adverse SOX 404 opinions VICW_ADVERSE. The percentage of IPO registrants that
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are accelerated filers, ACCEL, is 92 percent. The mean (median) number of geographic
segments, LN_GEOSEG, is 1.15 (1.10), respectively.
In the pooled subsequent misstatements sample (Panel E), 24 percent of the
registrants comprise the voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statements
group, VICW. Approximately ten percent of the registrants are in the VICW_REST
group that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in IPO registration statements and misstated postIPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date. The REST group that
misstated post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date is
approximately 21 percent of the sample. Approximately 43 percent of IPO registrants
operate in high litigation industries LIT, and the mean (median) of LN_TA is 6.26 (6.14),
respectively. On average, 62 percent of the auditor opinions include an explanatory
paragraph stating that the auditor was not engaged to audit internal control over financial
reporting, and accordingly does not express an opinion, AU9550. The majority of IPO
registrants engage BIGN auditors, and 55 percent of the SOX 404 auditor opinions
occurred after the passage of AS 5, AS5_404.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
4.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives
I estimate equation (1) to examine the association between management’s
incentive to increase disclosure credibility and voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO
registration statements. Table 5 presents the coefficient estimates and z-statistics from
estimating equation (1) using logistic regression. NEWCEO and CEOAGE are included
in columns (1) and (2) respectively. Column (3) includes both management credibility
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proxies simultaneously. The area under the ROC curves in columns (1), (2), and (3)
suggests the models are a reasonable fit (0.693, 0.682, and 0.694, respectively), following
Lemeshow and Hosmer (1982). Additionally, the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic fails to
reject the null hypothesis that the models are a good fit (0.191, 0.231, and 0.182,
respectively). All p-values in the table are one-tailed.9
[INSERT TABLE 5]
In column (1) the coefficient for NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.567) is positive and
significant suggesting that new CEOs are more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in
their IPO registration statement. The positive coefficient for LIT (z-stat, 1.753) indicates
a positive association between litigation risk and voluntary disclosure of ICWs in IPO
registration statements. The negative coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, -2.419) suggests that
larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration
statements. The positive coefficient for REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 5.688), consistent
with prior research, (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Kinney and McDaniel 1989), indicates
a positive association between IPO registration statements including restated financial
statements and voluntarily disclosing ICWs. The positive coefficient for FOREIGN (zstat, 3.170) suggests that registrants with foreign operations are more likely to voluntarily
disclosing ICWs in their IPO registration statements.
In column (2), the coefficient on CEOAGE is not significant suggesting no
association between CEOs’ conservatism and risk aversion and voluntarily disclosing
ICWs. The positive coefficients for LIT (z-stat, 1.675), REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat,

9

No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables
using the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsh (1980) approach.
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5.361), and FOREIGN (z-stat, 3.267) continue to suggest a positive association between
registrants’ litigation risk, prior restated financial statements, and foreign operations and
voluntary disclosure of ICWs. The negative coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, -2.288)
continues to suggest that larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in
their IPO registration statements.
In column (3), the NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.562) coefficient continues to be positive
and significant while CEOAGE continues to be insignificant. The coefficients on LIT,
LN_TA, REST_REGISTRANT, and FOREIGN are consistent with results in columns
(1) and (2). In combination, Table 5 suggests that new CEOs who are likely to have
greater incentives to establish disclosure credibility are also more likely to disclose ICWs
voluntarily in their IPO registration statements. Litigation risk, prior restatements, and
foreign operations are also positively associated with disclosing ICWs in IPO registration
statements. Larger registrants are less likely to disclose ICWs in IPO registration
statements.
4.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices
I estimate equation (2) to examine the association between IPO offer prices and
voluntary ICW disclosures. Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of
estimating equation (2) using OLS. I include ICW_REGISTRANT in column (1) and
MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY in column (2). All p-values in the table are
two-tailed. I do not report the coefficients for the year fixed effects for brevity.10
[INSERT TABLE 6]

10

No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach.
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In column (1), the coefficient on ICW_REGISTRANT (t-stat, 2.075) is positive
and significant suggesting that underwriters assign a higher IPO offer price to registrants
that disclose ICWs. This result suggests that credibility efforts may be successful.
Consistent with prior literature the coefficient for EPS (t-stat, 5.251) is positive and
significant indicating a positive association between profitable registrants and higher IPO
offer prices. The positive and significant coefficient for BV (t-stat, 2.437) suggests a
positive association between IPO registrants with a higher book value of equity and
higher IPO offer prices. The coefficient for UW_SHARE (t-stat, 4.064) is positive and
significant suggesting a positive association between registrants that hire underwriting
firms that underwrite a larger proportion of IPOs and higher IPO offer prices. The
coefficient for LIT (t-stat, -5.317) is negative and significant suggesting a negative
association between IPO registrants operating in high litigation industries and lower IPO
offer prices. The coefficient for CEOAGE (t-stat, -3.961) is negative and significant
suggesting a negative association between IPO registrants led by older CEOs and lower
IPO offer prices. This finding is consistent with prior research suggesting that investor
perceptions influence registrants’ valuations (Blankespoor, Hendricks, and Miller 2015).
Blankespoor et al. (2015) find a negative association between CEO age and investor
perceptions of IPO registrants.
I next examine the relation between the types of ICW disclosed in the IPO
registration statement and IPO offer prices in column (2). I find a positive and significant
coefficient on MW_ONLY (t-stat, 2.788) suggesting a positive association between IPO
registrants that disclose material weaknesses and higher IPO offer prices. The
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coefficients for EPS, BV, UW_SHARE, LIT, and CEOAGE are consistent with results in
Column (1). In combination, Table 6 suggests a positive association between voluntary
ICW disclosures and higher IPO offer prices. These results suggest that underwriters are
comfortable with efforts to disclose internal control problems early.
4.4 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates and z-statistics for the Firth logistic
estimation of equation (3) using ICW_404 as the dependent variable. In column (1)
ICW_404 is an indicator variable for those companies whose auditors provide an adverse
opinion in their first SOX 404 report. All p-values in the table are one-tailed. I do not
report the coefficients for the year and industry fixed effects for brevity.11
[INSERT TABLE 7]
In column (1), the coefficient for ICW_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 2.509) is positive
and significant suggesting registrants that voluntarily disclose internal control
deficiencies in their IPO registration statements have a higher likelihood of post-IPO
material weaknesses. As expected, the model includes a positive and significant
coefficient on LOSS (z-stat, 2.246) suggesting that unprofitable companies have a higher
likelihood of post-IPO material weaknesses. Consistent with prior literature, the
coefficient on FOREIGN (z-stat, 1.450) is positive and significant suggesting that
companies that are more complex have a higher likelihood of post-IPO material
weaknesses. In combination, the Table 7 results provide evidence that registrants that
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No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach.
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voluntarily disclose internal control deficiencies in their registration statements have a
higher likelihood of reporting post-IPO SOX 404 material weaknesses.
4.5 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Market Reaction to Subsequent SOX 404
Material Weakness
I estimate equation (4) to examine the association between cumulative abnormal
returns at the SOX 404 audit report filing date and voluntary ICW disclosures in
registration statements. Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from
estimating equation (4) using OLS. I do not report the coefficients for the year and
industry fixed effects for brevity.12 All p-values in the table are two-tailed.
[INSERT TABLE 8]
In column (1), the negative coefficient for VICW_ADVERSE (t-stat -1.852)
suggests that investors respond negatively when registrants voluntarily disclose ICWs in
their IPO registration statement and receive an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion in the
first year of SOX 404 compliance. This finding suggests investors are surprised by an
adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion when ICWs are disclosed at the IPO date because
investors expect the ICWs to be remediated once disclosed. Prior research suggests that
the market does not react to SOX 404 disclosures (Beneish et al. 2008). However, prior
studies do find that the market reacts to SOX Section 302 voluntary disclosures of ICWs
(Kim and Park 2009; Franco et al. 2005; Hammersley et al. 2008). Specifically,
Hammersley et al. (2008) suggest the severity of ICWs, management’s conclusion
regarding the effectiveness of the controls, the audibility of the ICWs, and the vagueness
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No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach.
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of the voluntary disclosure is informative in explaining market reactions to ICW
disclosures. The sample registrants that received an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion
disclosed the same ICWs in both the IPO registration statement and their annual report
associated with the adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion. Thus, the negative reaction
associated with VICW_ADVERSE suggests investors perceive the voluntarily disclosed
ICWs at the IPO as severe or pervasive because remediation did not occur before the
SOX 404 auditor assessment. For those registrants that received unqualified SOX 404
auditor opinions, the cumulative abnormal returns did not differ from IPO registrants that
did not disclose ICWs in their registration statements and received an unqualified SOX
404 audit report. This result suggests that subsequent remediation of the disclosed ICW
likely improves managements’ disclosure credibility. The positive coefficient for ACCEL
(t-stat, 1.730) suggests that investors respond positively to those registrants that are
accelerated filers. In combination, Table 8 results suggest management’s attempts to
increase disclosure credibility is unsuccessful when disclosures do not also result in
remediation.
4.6 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements
Table 9 presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds ratios from the
logistic regression comparing the determinants of IPO registrants that have indicators of
degrading financial reporting quality with IPO registrants with no indicators of degrading
financial statement quality. The base group is registrants that do not voluntarily disclose
ICWs in the IPO registration statement and report no post-IPO internal control
deficiencies or misstatements. The remaining three groups are registrants that voluntarily
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disclose ICWs in IPO registration statements (VICW), disclose ICWs in IPO registration
statements and misstate post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO date
(VICW_REST), and misstate post-IPO financial statements within three years of the IPO
date (REST). Column (1) presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds ratios
for VICW registrants. Column (2) presents the coefficient estimates, z-statistics, and odds
ratios for VICW_REST registrants. Column (3) presents the coefficient estimates, zstatistics, and odds ratios for REST registrants. All p-values in the table are two-tailed.13
[INSERT TABLE 9]
In column (1) the coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, 2.471) is positive and significant
suggesting larger registrants compared to the base group are 28.7 percent more likely to
voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements.

14

Also, the positive

coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, 3.127) suggests that registrants with a higher ratio of
accounts receivables and inventory to total assets compared to the base group are 789.8
percent more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements.
The negative coefficient for AU9550 (z-stat, -2.308) suggests that compared to the base
group registrants whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration contains nonstandard language in accordance with AU Section 9550 are 38.2 percent less likely to
voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements. The positive coefficient
for FOREIGN (z-stat, 2.757) suggests that registrants that are more complex compared to
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No evidence of degrading collinearity is noted when examining multi-collinearity for all model variables
using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach.
14 The odds ratio is used to determine the likelihood of an outcome with respect to the base group. To
determine the likelihood for determinants that are positively related to the outcome, subtract 1 from the
odds ratio. For determinants that are negatively related to the outcome, subtract the odds ratio from 1 to
determine the likelihood. For example, LN_TA is 28.7 percent more likely to be a VICW outcome (1.287 1) = 0.287.
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the base group are 93.9 percent more likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO
registration statements. The positive coefficient for AS5_404 (z-stat, 4.114) suggests that
compared to the base group registrants completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are
171.5 percent more likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration
statements. The negative coefficient for BODSIZE (z-stat, -3.558) suggests that
registrants with larger boards of directors compared to the base group are 23.7 percent
less likely to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements. The negative
coefficient for NAS (z-stat, -2.465) suggests that compared to the base group registrants
with a greater proportion of non-audit service fees to total fees are 84.7 percent less likely
to disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO registration statements.
In column (2) the negative coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, -2.286) suggests that
registrants with a higher ratio of accounts receivables and inventory to total assets
compared to the base group are 91.0 percent less likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in
their IPO registration statements and misstate their financial statements within three years
after the IPO. Approximately one percent of registrants stated that accounts receivable
and/or inventory were both an ICW in the IPO registration statement and one of multiple
accounting rule application failures leading to the misstatement. The positive coefficient
for Z (z-stat, 1.705) is not related to the likelihood of disclosing ICWs in their IPO
registration statements and misstating their financial statements within three years after
the IPO. Also, the negative coefficient on BIGN (z-stat, -2.400) suggests that IPO
registrants that hire Big N auditors compared to the base group are 60.0 percent less
likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements and misstate their
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financial statements within three years after the IPO. The positive coefficient for
FOREIGN (z-stat, 1.957) suggests that registrants that are more complex compared to the
base group are 191.1 percent more likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO
registration statements and misstate their financial statements within three years after the
IPO. The negative coefficient for AS5_404 (z-stat, -3.048) suggests that compared to the
base group those registrants completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are 10.1
percent less likely to voluntarily disclose ICWs in their IPO registration statements and
misstate their financial statements within three years after the IPO.
In column (3) the negative coefficient for INVREC (z-stat, -1.842) suggests that
compared to the base group registrants with a higher ratio of accounts receivables and
inventory to total assets are 75.6 percent less likely to misstate their financial statements
within three years after the IPO. In both columns 2 and 3 the sign on the coefficient for
INVREC is inconsistent with prior literature that suggests INVREC is a significant
predictor of misstatements. In a manual screening of the misstatement registrants, one
percent of the registrants’ misstatements relate exclusively to inventory. Approximately
five percent of registrants stated that accounts receivable and/or inventory were one of
multiple accounting rule application failures leading to the misstatement. Thus, the
likelihood of a misstatement relating to inventory is low in this sample. The positive
coefficient for AU9550 (z-stat, 2.006) suggests that compared to the base group
registrants whose IPO audit report included in the IPO registration contains non-standard
language consistent with AU Section 9550 are 57.4 percent more likely to misstate their
financial statements within three years after the IPO. The negative coefficient for
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AS5_404 (z-stat, -4.147) suggests that compared to the base group those registrants
completing their IPO after the passage of AS 5 are 58.5 percent less likely to misstate
their financial statements within three years after the IPO. Given the results in Table 9, I
now compare the regression coefficients across the three indicators of degrading financial
reporting quality using seemingly unrelated estimation.
4.7 Seemingly Unrelated Estimation of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality
Groups
I test for differences in the VICW, VICW_REST, and REST groups of degrading
financial reporting quality because some of the control variables are significant for
multiple degrading financial reporting quality groups. I examine whether the controls
that are significant for multiple degrading financial reporting quality groups are a
stronger predictor for inclusion in any one of the three groups. I use seemingly unrelated
estimation (SUEST) (Zellner 1962) by estimating equation (5) separately for the three
groups and testing the equality of the coefficients. SUEST combines the parameter
estimates and covariance matrices of the three models into a single parameter vector and
simultaneous covariance matrix, allowing for cross-testing hypotheses. The advantage of
this method over a regression that pools the groups is that that it does not assume equal
residual variance between the three groups or constrain coefficients to be equal.
[INSERT TABLE 10]
Table 10 presents the coefficient estimates and tests of differences in the
coefficients across the groups using SUEST to determine which company characteristics
have the largest effect on being in one of the degrading financial reporting quality groups.
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Tests of differences between the VICW and VICW_REST groups indicate that LN_TA,
INVREC, Z, BIGN, AU9550, FOREIGN, AS5_404, BODSIZE, DUALCEO, and NAS
differ between the VICW and VICW_REST groups. Larger companies (LN_TA) and
companies with higher inventory and receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC)
positively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration
statements. Companies that have foreign operations (FOREIGN) or complete their IPO
after AS 5 (AS5_404) positively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures
in IPO registration statements. Companies with more board members (BODSIZE) and
companies with a higher proportion of non-audit service fees to total audit fees (NAS)
negatively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration
statements. Companies that hire Big N auditors (BIGN) or include an explanatory
paragraph disclaiming an auditor opinion on internal control over financial reporting
(AU9550) negatively predict the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO
registration statements.15
Statistical tests of the models indicate that LN_TA, INVREC, AU9550,
FOREIGN, AS5_404, BODSIZE, and NAS are statistically different between the VICW
and REST groups. Larger companies (LN_TA) and companies with higher inventory and
receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC) continue to predict the choice to include
voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements. Companies that have foreign
operations (FOREIGN) or complete their IPO after AS 5 (AS5_404) continue to predict

Companies’ Z scores (Z) and CEOs that are the Chairman of the board of directors (DUALCEO) are
statistically significantly different between the VICW and VICW_REST groups. However, neither Z nor
DUALCEO are significant predictors of the two groups.
15
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the choice to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.
Companies with more board members (BODSIZE) and companies with a higher
proportion of non-audit service fees to total audit fees (NAS) continue to predict the
choice to exclude voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements. Companies
that include an explanatory paragraph disclaiming an auditor opinion on internal control
over financial reporting (AU9550) continue to predict the choice to exclude voluntary
ICW disclosures in IPO registration statements.
Statistical tests of the models indicate that INVREC, BIGN, AS5_404, and
BODSIZE are statistically different between the VICW_REST and REST groups.
Companies with higher inventory and receivables to total assets ratios (INVREC) or more
board members (BODSIZE) negatively predict including voluntary ICW disclosures in
IPO registration statements and misstating financial statements within three years of the
IPO. Companies that hire Big N auditors (BIGN), or complete their IPO after AS 5
(AS5_404) are less likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures in IPO registration
statements and to misstate financial statements within three years of the IPO.
CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
5.1 Self-Selection Correction – IPO Valuation
Because registrants’ decisions to voluntarily disclose ICWs is a function of many
factors, the choice to disclose ICWs voluntarily is non-random and thus generates the
potential for selection bias. To control for this potential selection bias, I estimate the
average treatment effect of IPO registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily in their IPO
registration statements on their IPO offer price using ETREGRESS from STATA (Cerulli
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2014; Peel 2014). ETREGRESS estimates the average treatment effect on the treated
observations (i.e., disclose ICWs voluntarily) when the outcome (i.e., IPO offer price)
may not be conditionally independent of the treatment. Using this approach, I first model
the choice to disclose ICWs as a function of registrant characteristics, using the following
treatment model:
TREAT (ICW_REGISTRANT) = β0 + β1 IND_PRESSURE + β2 NEWCEO +
β3 CEOAGE + β4 LN_MV + β5 LIT + β6 LN_TA + β7 BIGN + β8 LN_AGE +
β9 VC_BACKED + β10 PE_BACKED + β11 CARVEOUT + β12 NASDAQ + β13 GC +
β14 REST_REGISTRANT + β15 LN_BUSSEG + β16 FOREIGN + β17 GDWLIP +
β18 WDP + β19 AUDITOR_CHG + ε
(6)
The dependent variable in equation (6), ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient
internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its
registration statement. The treatment model includes an instrumental variable that affects
the binary decision to obtain treatment (Maddala 1983). I use industry pressure
(IND_PRESSURE) as the instrumental variable in the treatment equation because the
proportion of IPO registrants in the same industry that voluntarily disclose ICWs in their
registration statements should not affect the IPO offer price; however, it is associated
with the decision to voluntarily disclose ICWs. I calculate IND_PRESSURE as ratio of
the number of registrants voluntarily disclosing ICWs in their registration statements for
each Fama-French industry classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO
registrants in the industry. The (untabulated) correlation between IND_PRESSURE and
choosing to voluntarily disclose ICWs (ICW_REGISTRANT), is 0.13 and is significant
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(p-value = <0.001), while the (untabulated) correlation between IND_PRESSURE and
LN_IPO_PRICE is -0.23 (p-value = <0.001).16
The decision to disclose ICWs voluntarily is a function of various registrant
characteristics; therefore, in the treatment model, I control for registrant characteristics
that potentially affect IPOs’ choices to disclose ICWs voluntarily. I control for
NEWCEO, CEOAGE, LN_MV, LIT, LN_TA, BIGN, LN_AGE, VC_BACKED,
PE_BACKED, CARVEOUT, NASDAQ, GC, REST_REGISTRANT, LN_BUSSEG,
FOREIGN, GDWLIP, WDP, AUDITOR_CHG because prior research suggests that the
choice to voluntarily disclose ICWs in IPO registration statements is associated with
CEO characteristics, litigation risk, the registrants’ auditors and capital providers, and
other registrant characteristics (Jain and Tabek 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007; Krishnan 2005; Goh 2009; Rice and
Weber 2012; Beatty 1989; Beatty and Welch 1996; Hogan 1997; Mayhew and Wilkins
2003; Lou and Vasvari 2013; Gompers and Lerner 2000; Wallin and Dahlstrand 2006;
Willenborg and McKeown 2001; Kinney and McDaniel 1989). The predictions for the
control variables in equation (6) are consistent with those documented in the Voluntary
ICW Disclosure Incentives section above. Appendix B provides a summary of all
variables.

16

The correlations suggest endogeneity between the instrumental variable (IND_PRESSURE) and the
second stage outcome (LN_IPO_PRICE). Accordingly, I use a series of methods for treatment -effects
estimation under treatment endogeneity that use only conditional-moment restrictions (Cerulli 2014; Peel
2014).
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In the outcome model, I examine the average treatment effect of those registrants
that disclose ICWs voluntarily on registrants’ IPO valuations. I use the following OLS
model:
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW_REGISTRANT + β2 EPS + β3 BV +
β4 NET_PROCEEDS + β5 UW_SHARE + β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 LIT +
β9 NEWCEO + β10 CEOAGE + β11 LAMDA + YearFE + ε
(7)
where LN_IPO_PRICE, the dependent variable in equation (7), is the logarithmic
transformation of the IPO offer price. The variable of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is
an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily
disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or
control deficiency) in its registration statement.
I control for EPS, BV, NET_PROCEEDS, UW_SHARE, BIGN, LN_AGE, LIT,
NEWCEO, and CEOAGE because prior research suggests that IPO offer prices are
associated with information in the prospectus and risk (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000;
Blankespoor et al. 2015). The predictions for the control variables in the model are
consistent with those documented in the Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer
Prices section above. I include the LAMDA from equation (6) to control for the potential
selection bias related to the association between the choice to include voluntary ICW
disclosures in IPO registration statements and IPO offer prices. I also include year fixed
effects to control for cross-sectional variation in IPO offer prices by year. Appendix B
provides a summary of all variables.
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Table 11 presents the results of estimating equation (6) predicting the likelihood
of a registrant including voluntary ICW disclosures in their IPO registration statements.
All p-values in the table are one-tailed.17
[INSERT TABLE 11]
The coefficient for IND_PRESSURE (z-stat, 1.922), is positive and significant
suggesting that the probability that a registrant includes voluntary ICW disclosures
increases as the proportion of other registrants within the same industry increases. I also
find positive and significant coefficients for the NEWCEO (z-stat, 2.320), LN_MV (zstat, 1.780), REST_REGISTRANT (z-stat, 5.068), and FOREIGN (z-stat, 2.913) control
variables. These coefficients suggest that the probability that a registrant includes
voluntary ICW disclosures increases as the registrants’ market value of equity increases
as well as when registrants hire a new CEO, restate prior financial statements, and have
foreign operations. I find a negative and significant coefficient for LN_TA (z-stat, 1.894) suggesting larger registrants are less likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures.
Table 12 presents the results of estimating equation (7) using the logarithmic
transformation of the IPO offer price as the dependent variable and whether the
registrants voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their registration statements. Because I do not
make directional predictions, all p-values in the tables are two-tailed. The coefficients on
the year fixed effects are not reported for brevity. 18 Column (1) presents the results on the

17

I also examine multi-collinearity for this equation using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach and find no
evidence of degrading collinearity.
18 I also examine multi-collinearity for this equation using the Belsley et al. (1980) approach and find no
evidence of degrading collinearity.

61
association between registrants’ IPO offer prices and disclosing ICWs voluntarily in IPO
registration statements.
[INSERT TABLE 12]
In column (1), the coefficient for ICW_REGISTRANT (t-stat, 2.353) is positive
and suggests that disclosing ICWs voluntarily in IPO registration statements is associated
with higher IPO offer prices. The coefficients for EPS (t-stat, 5.419), BV (t-stat, 3.032),
and UW_SHARE (t-stat, 4.943) are positive and significant. Thus, having higher
earnings per share, a higher book value of equity and being represented by underwriters’
with a higher proportion of market share of IPOs positively affects registrants’ IPO
valuations (Klein 1996; Beatty et al. 2000). The coefficients for LIT (t-stat, -5.814) and
CEOAGE (t-stat, -2.926) are negative and significant. Thus, those registrants that
operate in high litigation industries and hire older CEOs have lower IPO offer prices,
which is consistent with prior literature. The LAMDA (t-stat, -1.859) is negative and
significant suggesting that a standard OLS model would produce downwardly biased
estimates (Cong and Drukker 2000). The estimated correlation (rho) between the
treatment (ICW_REGISTRANT) and the outcome equation residual is -0.340. This
suggests that when unobservable factors increase an IPO offer price, the registrants’
propensity to voluntarily disclose ICWs decreases (and vice versa). In combination,
these results suggest that IPO offer prices are higher for those registrants that disclose
ICWs voluntarily.

62
5.2 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
To supplement my primary analyses, I perform one additional analysis for the
subsequent SOX 404 material weakness sample. The primary analysis includes a control
for the registrants’ Z-scores. After I winsorize the Z variable, the range of Z-scores
remains skewed. In my additional analysis (untabulated), I remove the Z control variable
and re-estimate equation (3). When re-estimating equation (3), I continue to find a
positive and significant coefficient on ICW_REGISTRANT (coefficient, 0.848; z-stat,
2.486), LOSS (coefficient, 0.904; z-stat, 2.488), and FOREIGN (coefficient, 0.751; z-stat,
1.929). I continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on LIT (coefficient, 0.661; z-stat, -1.871. These results suggest that my subsequent SOX 404 material
weakness sample results are not a function of registrants’ Z-scores.
5.3 Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent Misstatements
To supplement my primary analyses, I perform one additional analysis for the
indicators of degrading financial reporting quality sample. The primary analysis includes
a control for the registrants’ Z-scores. After I winsorize the Z variable, the range of Zscores remains skewed. In my additional analysis (untabulated), I remove the Z control
variable and re-estimate equation (5).
For the VICW group, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on
LN_TA (coefficient, 0.249; z-stat, 2.440), INVREC (coefficient, 2.168; z-stat, 3.106),
FOREIGN (coefficient, 0.655; z-stat, 2.734), and AS5_404 (coefficient, 1.017; z-stat,
4.197). I continue to find a negative and significant coefficient on AU9550 (coefficient, -
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0.475; z-stat, -2.282), BODSIZE (coefficient, -0.272; z-stat, -3.582), and NAS
(coefficient, -1.860; z-stat, -2.542).
For the VICW_REST group, I find a positive and significant coefficient on
FOREIGN (coefficient, 1.107; z-stat, 2.398), LN_BUSSEG (coefficient, 0.664; z-stat,
1.744), and LIT (coefficient, 1.260; z-stat, 2.672). I find a negative and significant
coefficient on CR (coefficient, -0.218; z-stat, -1.910), INVREC (coefficient, -4.054; zstat, -2.816), BIGN (coefficient, -1.597; z-stat, -3.364), and AS5_404 (coefficient, -0.691;
z-stat, -1.697).
For the REST group, I continue to find a positive and significant coefficient on
AU9550 (coefficient, 0.446; z-stat, 1.975). I continue to find a negative and significant
coefficient on INVREC (coefficient, -1.393; z-stat, -0.069) and AS5_404 (coefficient, 0.895; z-stat, -4.237). These results suggest that my indicators of degrading financial
reporting quality results are not a function of registrants’ Z-scores.
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
In this study, I first examine whether IPO registrants are more likely to disclose
ICWs to increase management’s disclosure credibility. The results suggest that IPO
registrants with new CEOs who likely have greater incentives to increase disclosure
credibility are more likely to include voluntary ICW disclosures in their registration
statements.
Then, I examine the association between IPO management’s voluntary disclosure
of ICWs and IPO offer prices. The results suggest that offer prices of IPO registrants that
voluntarily disclose ICWs are higher than those of IPO registrants that do not disclose.
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Thus, the voluntary ICW disclosures are informative, and underwriters do not view the
disclosures negatively.
Next, I examine the association between IPO management’s voluntary disclosure
of ICWs and subsequent SOX 404 material weaknesses. The results suggest an
association between voluntary ICW disclosures and a higher likelihood of reported
material weaknesses in the first SOX 404 auditor opinion. The majority of registrants
that voluntarily disclosed ICWs in their IPO registration statement and received adverse
SOX 404 auditor opinions reported similar ICWs in both SEC filings. Thus, the results
provide evidence of an association between IPO registrants who include voluntary ICW
disclosures in their registration statements and lower financial reporting quality after their
offerings.
Then, I examine the extent to which voluntary disclosure of ICWs builds
disclosure credibility with investors when subsequent negative events occur (i.e., SOX
404 material weakness). Interpreting the results requires caution about the ability to
control for contaminating information released contemporaneously, and about the
reliance on analysts’ expectations of earnings. Subject to these limits, the evidence
suggests that IPO registrants’ voluntary ICW disclosures are informative because
negative cumulative abnormal returns only occur for unremediated disclosed ICWs.
Finally, I examine the determinants of IPO registrants that have indicators of
degrading financial reporting quality. The results suggest that voluntarily disclosing
ICWs is not exclusively associated with misstatements occurring within three years of the
IPO date. Approximately 62 percent of the sample have registration statements’ auditor
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opinions that include an explanatory paragraph disclaiming an opinion on internal control
over financial reporting. The results suggest registrants’ whose auditor opinions include
this explanatory paragraph are more likely to have post-IPO misstatements even when the
auditor issued an unqualified SOX 404 opinion in the year of misstatement. This finding
suggests no adjustments in audit procedures in years after the IPO to account for the
increased risk related to internal controls. Overall, my findings provide evidence that
misstatements appear to outpace material weakness disclosures for the sample of IPO
registrants.

This study contributes to several literature. First, this study extends the research
on the effects of SOX by establishing an association between the market reactions to
SOX 404 material weakness disclosures preceded by management’s voluntary ICW
disclosures. Second, it offers additional evidence on the value of voluntary disclosures
for IPO registrants. Third, it broadens the disclosure literature by providing evidence that
new CEOs have greater incentives to include voluntary disclosures. This setting is
particularly informative because it provides insights about the integrity of individual
registrants’ financial reporting processes and management’s disclosure credibility before
SOX 302 and SOX 404 ICW disclosures are required. Fourth, it contributes to the audit
literature by providing evidence of an association between voluntary disclosure of ICWs
and a decrease in financial reporting quality. Fifth, it complements the extant literature on
ICWs and misstatements by suggesting that misstatements are outpacing material
weakness disclosures.
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The results are timely and relevant to regulators because the relationship between
misstatements and unqualified audit opinions is puzzling. Additionally, the JOBS Act
regulation allows IPO registrants to delay SOX 404 compliance for up to five years.
Finally, this study’s results are important to investors because the purpose of SOX 404 is
to provide advanced warning of financial reporting weaknesses.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLES OF VOLUNTARY ICW DISCLOSURES
We have had a material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting.
In connection with the preparation of our financial statements as of and for the year
ended December 31, 2010, our independent registered public accounting firm identified a
material weakness in internal control over financial reporting with respect to: (i) the
period of time over which initiation fees were recognized; (ii) the amortization period
associated with data acquisition costs; (iii) expenses related to warrants issued in
connection with our 2008 debt facility; and (iv) the recognition of sales tax expense in
certain states, and in each case we adjusted the results of prior periods. Specifically:
• We had previously amortized initiation fees from our members over the length
of the member contract, and we now amortize initiation fees over the expected life
of the member based on our experience.
• We had previously amortized data acquisition costs that we acquired over ten
years, and we now amortize data acquisition costs over three years.
• We had previously valued the warrant to purchase common stock issued to our
lender in connection with our 2008 debt facility at a fixed amount negotiated with
the lender. We revalued the warrant at its fair value at the time of grant.
• We had not previously recognized state sales tax expense, and we now have
adopted appropriate provisions in that regard.
Under standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a
deficiency in internal control over financial reporting exists when the design or operation
of a control does not allow management or personnel, in the normal course of performing
their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely basis. A material
weakness is a deficiency or combination of deficiencies in internal control over financial
reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of our
annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on
a timely basis. While we believe that we have remediated the material weakness
identified by our independent registered public accounting firm, we cannot assure that
there will not be additional material weaknesses and significant deficiencies that our
independent registered public accounting firm or we will identify. If we identify such
issues or if we are unable to produce accurate and timely financial statements, our stock
price may be adversely affected and we may be unable to maintain compliance with
listing requirements of our stock exchange.
In addition, we will need to evaluate our internal controls over financial reporting in
connection with Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in our annual report for 2011, and
our auditors will be required to attest to our internal controls over financial reporting
starting with our annual report for 2012. This assessment will need to include disclosure
of any material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting identified by
our management, as well as our auditors’ attestation report on our internal controls over
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financial reporting. We are just beginning the costly and challenging process of
compiling the system and processing documentation needed to comply with such
requirements. We may not be able to complete our evaluation, testing and any required
remediation in a timely fashion. If we identify one or more material weaknesses in our
internal control over financial reporting during the evaluation and testing process, we will
be unable to assert that our internal control over financial reporting is effective. If we are
unable to assert that our internal control over financial reporting is effective, or if our
auditors are unable to express an opinion on the effectiveness of our internal control over
financial reporting, we could lose investor confidence in the accuracy and completeness
of our financial reports, which could have a material adverse effect on the price of our
common stock.
~Angie’s List, Inc. November 17, 2011
The audit of our financial statements for each of the years ended December 31, 2002,
2003 and 2004, identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial
reporting, and if not corrected, these material weaknesses could result in a material
misstatement of our results of operations or financial condition, which could harm our
business and reputation and cause the price of our common stock to decline.
In connection with the audit of our financial statements for each of the years ended
December 31, 2002, 2003 and 2004, our independent registered public accounting firm
identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting with
respect to:
• our financial closing and reporting process;
• our inventory costing and tracking methodology;
• our documentation supporting our accounting records; and
• our contemporaneous documentation of significant, non-routine transactions.
A material weakness is a reportable condition in which the design or operation of one or
more accounting controls and procedures does not reduce to a relatively low likelihood
the risk that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not
be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the normal course of
performing their assigned functions.
The material weakness in our financial closing and reporting process resulted from a
combination of the following factors:
• our failure to accurately account for complex transactions;
• our failure to monitor and apply new and emerging accounting principles
generally accepted in the U.S., or GAAP;
• our lack of formal processes related to the consolidation of financial information
and the financial statement preparation process; and
• our failure to reconcile our accounts in a timely and accurate manner.

80
The material weakness in our inventory tracking and costing methodology related to the
method by which we had accounted for certain inventory related costs in each of 2002,
2003 and 2004. In these years, we did not appropriately capitalize these costs in inventory
which resulted in adjustments to our financial statements. In addition, we also did not
have a formal process for tracking our inventory.
The material weakness with respect to our accounting records related to our lack of
supporting documentation that should have been readily available to evidence routine
transactions, principally in 2002 and 2003.
The material weakness in the documentation of significant and non-routine transactions
related specifically to a lack of contemporaneous documentation for certain of our equity
compensation arrangements in 2002 through 2004 and our acquisition of Foam Creations
in 2004.
We are in the process of addressing each of these material weaknesses. However, because
these material weaknesses exist, there is a heightened risk that a material misstatement of
our annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected. In addition,
the remediation steps we have taken, are taking, or plan to take may not effectively
remediate the material weaknesses, in which case our accounting controls and procedures
in these particular areas will continue to be ineffective.
Furthermore, once we become a public company, we will be required to comply with the
requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for the year ended
December 31, 2007 and subsequent periods. See "—We will be required to meet periodic
reporting requirements under SEC rules and regulations, and we will incur significant
time and expense in documenting, testing and certifying our internal control over
financial reporting, and any deficiencies in our internal controls could adversely affect
our business." In the event that we
do not adequately remedy these material weaknesses, our business, reputation and
financial condition may be adversely affected, there may be a negative reaction in the
financial markets due to a loss of confidence in the reliability of our financial statements,
which could cause the
price of our common stock to decline.
~ Crocs, Inc. February 8, 2006
Our management and auditors have identified material weaknesses in our internal
controls that, if not properly remediated, could result in material misstatements in our
financial statements and the inability of our management to provide its report on the
effectiveness of our internal controls as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
for years ending December 31, 2008 and thereafter, either of which could cause
investors to lose confidence in our reported financial information and have a negative
effect on the trading price of our stock.
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We are not currently required to comply with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and are therefore not required to make an assessment of the effectiveness of our
internal control over financial reporting. Further, our independent registered public
accounting firm has not been engaged to express, nor have they expressed, an opinion on
the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting. However, in connection
with our fiscal 2006 financial statement audit, our accounting firm informed us that they
had identified material weaknesses in our internal controls as defined by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
The material weaknesses reported relate to having insufficient personnel resources with
sufficient technical accounting expertise within our accounting function.
We are taking remedial measures to improve the effectiveness of our internal controls.
Specifically, we will be:
• strengthening our internal staffing to accommodate public company
requirements; and
• engaging an outside compliance consulting firm to advise us on improving our
internal controls and systems.
The existence of material weaknesses is an indication that there is a more than remote
likelihood that a material misstatement of our financial statements will not be prevented
or detected in a future period, and the process of designing and implementing effective
internal controls and procedures is a continuous effort that requires us to expend
significant resources to maintain a system of internal controls that is adequate to satisfy
our reporting obligations as a public company. We cannot assure you that the measures to
be taken in the future will remediate the material weaknesses noted by our independent
public accounting firm or that we will implement and maintain adequate controls over
our financial processes and reporting in the future. In addition, we cannot assure you that
additional material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in our internal controls will not
be discovered in the future. If we fail to develop and maintain effective controls and
procedures, we may be unable to provide the required financial information in a timely
and reliable manner or otherwise comply with the standards applicable to us as a public
company and we may not be able to provide a report on the effectiveness of our internal
controls for the year ending December 31, 2008, or later. Any failure by us to timely
provide the required financial information or provide a report on the effectiveness of our
internal controls could materially and adversely impact our financial condition and the
market value of our securities.
~ NeurogesX Inc. May 2, 2007
If we fail to remediate deficiencies in our internal control over financial reporting or
are unable to implement and maintain effective internal control over financial
reporting in the future, the accuracy, and timeliness of our financial reporting may be
adversely affected.
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In connection with the audits of our financial statements for 2009, 2010, and 2011, we
identified a material weakness in the design and operating effectiveness of our internal
control over financial reporting. A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of
deficiencies, that creates a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of a
company’s annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a
timely basis. The material weakness that we identified resulted from a lack of sufficient
number of qualified personnel within our accounting function that possessed an
appropriate level of expertise to effectively perform the following functions:
• identify, select, and apply GAAP sufficiently to provide reasonable assurance
that transactions were being appropriately recorded; and
• design control activities over the financial flows and reporting processes
necessary to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial
reporting and the preparation of financial statements.
We are taking numerous steps that we believe will address the underlying causes of the
control deficiencies described above, primarily through the hiring of additional
accounting and finance personnel with technical accounting and financial reporting
experience, development and implementation of policies, and improved processes and
documented procedures. If we fail to effectively remediate deficiencies in our control
environment or are unable to implement and maintain effective internal control over
financial reporting to meet the demands that will be placed upon us as a public company,
including the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, we may be unable to accurately report our financial results, or report them within the
timeframes required by law or exchange regulations.
Even if we are able to report our financial statements accurately and in a timely manner,
if we do not make all necessary improvements to address the material weakness,
continued disclosure of a material weakness will be required in future filings with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, which could cause our reputation to be
harmed and our stock price to decline.
We have not performed an evaluation of our internal control over financial reporting,
such as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, nor have we engaged our
independent registered public accounting firm to perform an audit of our internal control
over financial reporting as of any balance sheet date or for any period reported in our
financial statements. Had we performed such an evaluation or had our independent
registered public accounting firm performed an audit of our internal control over financial
reporting, control deficiencies, including material weaknesses and significant
deficiencies, in addition to those discussed above, may have been identified. In addition,
we are an “emerging growth company” as defined in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act, and as such we may elect to avail ourselves of the exemption from the requirement
that our independent registered public accounting firm audit our internal control over
financial reporting under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act until we cease to be an
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“emerging growth company.” See “—We are an “emerging growth company,” and any
decision on our part to comply only with certain reduced reporting and disclosure
requirements applicable to emerging growth companies could make our common stock
less attractive to investors,” for additional risks relating to our “emerging growth
company” status.
~Trulia, Inc. September 20, 2012
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APPENDIX B
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Dependent Variables
ICW_REGISTRANT

IPO_PRICE

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its
registration statement.
Offer price per share.

LN_IPO_PRICE

Logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE.

ICW_404

CAR(-1,1)
DFRQ

VICW

VICW_REST

REST

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their first SOX
404 report.
Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (equally weighted
index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day 0 is the filing date of the
second annual report including the first internal control over
financial reporting opinion.
Categorical dependent variable in equation (5).
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an
unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and
does not have a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned
in the internal control over financial reporting opinion.
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an
unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has
a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal
control over financial reporting opinion.
Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement,
has an unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion,
and has a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the
internal control over financial reporting opinion.

Variable of Interest
NEWCEO

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO
tenure at the registrant is zero years at the IPO date.

CEOAGE

CEO age at the IPO date.
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ICW

One of the four following ICW disclosure measures:
ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY.

MW_ONLY

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one material weakness in its
registration statement.

SD_ONLY

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one significant deficiency in its
registration statement.

CD_ONLY

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed, at least, one control deficiency in its
registration statement.

VICW_CLEAN

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its
registration statement and received an unqualified SOX 404 audit
opinion in its second annual report.

SILENT_ADVERSE

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
did not voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit
opinion in its second annual report.

VICW_ADVERSE

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls in its
registration statement and received an adverse SOX 404 audit
opinion in its second annual report.
Ratio of the number of registrants voluntarily disclosing ICWs in
their registration statements for each Fama-French industry
classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO
registrants in the industry.

IND_PRESSURE

Independent Variables
LN_TA

Logarithmic transformation of total assets.

LN_MV

Logarithmic transformation of the pre-IPO market value of equity.

LIT

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
operates in a high litigation risk industry; high litigation risk
industries are identified based on four-digit SIC following
Venkataraman et al. (2008).
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BIGN

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
has a Big N auditor obtained from the most recent audited financial
statements prior to the IPO.

LN_AGE

Logarithmic transformation of the registrant age.

VC_BACKED

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
is has venture capital backing.

PE_BACKED

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
has private equity backing.

CARVEOUT

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
is a spinoff from a public company.

NASDAQ

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
lists on the NASDAQ exchange.

GC

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
received a going concern opinion in the IPO registration statement.

REST_REGISTRANT

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
restated financial statements in the IPO registration statement.

LN_BUSSEG

Logarithmic transformation of the total number of business
segments.

FOREIGN

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
has foreign operations.

GDWLIP

Pre-tax goodwill impairments.

WDP

Pre-tax write-downs.

AUDITOR_CHG

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
has changed auditors since the prior audited financial statement date.

EPS

Income before operations divided by the common shares used to
calculate earnings per share fully diluted obtained from the most
recent audited financial statements prior to the IPO.

BV

Ratio of total common/ordinary equity, obtained from the most
recent audited financial statements prior to the IPO, divided by the
number of shares offered in the registration statement and this ratio
is multiplied by 1,000.

NET_PROCEEDS

Portion of the IPO proceeds retained by the issuer divided by the
total IPO proceeds.
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UW_SHARE

Ratio of the cumulative offer proceeds underwritten by the lead
underwriter during the sample period divided by the aggregate offer
proceeds for the entire sample.

LACK_RESOURCES

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
discloses an ICW in its IPO registration statement related to an in
sufficient complement of personnel with the appropriate level of
knowledge, experience, and training.

LOSS

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
has a net loss.

CR

Ratio of current assets to current liabilities.

INVREC

Ratio of the sum of inventory and receivables to total assets.

Z

Altman (2000) Z score.

DIFF_AUD

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the auditor
changed from the IPO.

AU9550

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant’s IPO audit report included in the IPO registration
contains non-standard language in accordance with AU Section
9550 that states the auditor’s opinion does not include an opinion on
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.

LN_FEES

Logarithmic transformation of the total audit fees.

NAS

Ratio of non-audit fees to total fees.

BM

Ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity.

ACCEL

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant
is an accelerated filer as defined by the SEC (market value of equity
> $75 million).

LEV

Ratio of the total debt to total assets.

BHR

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the buy-andhold abnormal return over the 120 days before the SOX 404 auditor
opinion (i.e., from day -120 to -1) is less than zero.

LN_GEOSEG

Logarithmic transformation of the total number of geographic
segments.

SALES_GROWTH

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrants’ sales growth is in the top quintile.
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INVT

Ratio of inventory to total assets.

UE

Reported IBES earnings minus the median consensus analyst EPS
forecast, deflated by stock price.

NEG_ROA

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if if the
registrant reports a negative return on assets.

AS5_404

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if if the
registrant’s auditor opinion is issued after the passage of AS 5.

BODSIZE

Total number of members on the board of directors.

DUALCEO

Indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the CEO is
also the board chair.

LAMBDA

Inverse-Mills ratio.
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Table 1
Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Indicators Sample Composition
Group
Description
Observations
Sample
%
0
No indicators of degrading financial reporting quality
288
45.35
(Base Group)
1
VICW
151
23.78
2
VICW_REST
63
9.92
3
REST
133
20.94
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Table 2
Sample Selection
Panel A: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives
Description
1
2
3
4

Voluntary Disclosure of
ICWs
1215

Beginning population19
Drop observations missing Compustat data for
year-end before IPO
Drop observations missing BoardEx CEO data
Ending sample

(188)
(419)
608

Panel B: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Prices
1
2
3

Description
Beginning population
Drop observations missing Compustat data
Ending sample

SOX 404 Auditor Opinions
608
(18)
590

Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
1
2
3
4

19

Description
Beginning population20
Drop observations missing Compustat data
Drop observations missing Audit Analytics data
for second annual report filing after the IPO
Ending sample

SOX 404 Auditor Opinions
1042
(111)
(146)
785

The sample is restricted to registrants that originally file their registration statement with the SEC on
form S-1 or F-1 and have subsequent Audit Analytics and Compustat data available. Detailed sample
procedures provided upon request.
20 The sample is restricted to registrants that have Compustat total assets available for the second annual
report after the IPO registration statement. Detailed sample procedures provided upon request.
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Table 2 (continued)
Sample Selection
Panel D: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses Market
Reaction
1
2
3
4
5
6

7

Description
Beginning population21
Drop observations missing Compustat data
Drop observations missing Audit Analytics data
for second annual report filing after the IPO
Drop observations with missing CAR data
Drop observations with missing IBES data
Drop observations with different ICWs
disclosed in IPO and adverse SOX 404 auditor
opinion
Ending sample

SOX 404 Auditor Opinions
1042
(7)
(113)
(159)
(242)

(4)
517

Panel E: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements
1
2
3
4

5
6

21

Description
Beginning population22
Drop observations missing Compustat data
Drop observations with misstatement occurring
more than three years after the IPO
Drop observations with SOX 404 material
weakness related to the same year of the
misstatement
Drop observations missing BoardEx data
Ending sample

SOX 404 Auditor Opinions
1307
(181)
(324)

(67)
(100)
635

The sample is restricted to registrants that have Compustat total assets available for the second annual
report after the IPO registration statement. Detailed sample procedures provided upon request.
22 The sample is restricted to registrants that have Audit Analytics dat a available after the IPO registration
statement. Detailed sample procedures provided upon request.
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Table 3
Sample Composition
Panel A: Classification by Industry
FF
Industry
H1
Code
1
Food
8
2
Mining and minerals
9
3
Oil and petroleum products
50
4
Textiles, apparel, and footwear
6
5
Consumer durables
8
6
Chemicals
11
7
Consumer drugs, soap, perfumes, and
21
tobacco
8
Construction and construction materials
5
9
Steel works
3
10
Fabricated products
1
11
Machinery and business equipment
66
12
Automobiles
5
13
Transportation
19
14
Utilities
10
15
Retail stores
34
16
Financial institutions
87
17
Other
265
Total
608

H2

H3

H4

H5

7
9
48
6
8
11
21

15
11
68
9
9
15
41

7
5
44
5
5
9
23

4
5
55
5
7
10
19

4
3
1
65
4
18
9
33
84
259
590

9
6
2
103
6
50
18
46
32
345
785

6
2
2
61
3
32
12
18
74
209
517

10
2
91
5
38
30
35
13
306
635
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Table 3 (continued)
Sample Composition
Panel B: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives
ICW_REGISTRANT
IPO Year
N
n=1
Sample %
106
23
21.70%
2005
2006
27
24.11%
112
2007

101

29

38.61%

2008
2009

19

7
11

36.84%
33.33%

24

28.57%

22
18

30.99%
25.35%

1

9.09%

2010
2011
2012
2013

33
84
71
71
11

Panel C: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Price
ICW_REGISTRANT
Fiscal Year
N
n=1
Sample %
2005
22
21.36%
103
2006

107

24

22.43%

2007
2008

100
18

28
6

28.00%
33.33%

2009

31

11

35.48%

2010
2011

83

24
22

28.92%
32.35%

18
1

25.71%
10.00%

2012
2013

68
70
10

94
Table 3 (continued)
Sample Composition
Panel D: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404
Material Weaknesses
ICW_REGISTRANT
Fiscal Year
N
n=1
Sample %
1
0
00.00%
2005
2006

98

23

23.47%

2007
2008

147
142

45
48

30.61%
33.80%

2009

25

9

36.00%

2010
2011

42
100

17
42

40.48%
42.00%

2012

87

30

34.48%

2013
2014

86
57

26
12

30.23%
21.05%

Panel E: Classification by Year – Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404
Material Weaknesses Market Reaction
ICW_REGISTRANT
Fiscal Year
N
n=1
Sample %
2006
17
19.77%
86
2007

141

41

29.08%

2008
2009

125
22

41
6

32.80%
27.27%

2010

41

13

31.71%

2011
2012

92
10

34
3

36.96%
30.00%
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Table 3 (continued)
Sample Composition
Panel F: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements
ICW_REGISTRANT
Fiscal Year
N
n=1
Sample %
2005
4
21.05%
19
2006
10
24.39%
41
2007

57

16

28.07%

2008
2009

66

23
23

34.85%
34.85%

33

37.50%

30
38

32.61%
36.89%

2013

92
103
102

36

35.29%

2014

1

1

100.00%

2010
2011
2012

66
88

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs Incentives
Variable
ICW_REGISTRANT
NEWCEO
CEOAGE
LN_MV
LIT
LN_TA
BIGN
LN_AGE
VC_BACKED
PE_BACKED
CARVEOUT
NASDAQ
GC
REST_REGISTRANT
LN_BUSSEG
FOREIGN
GDWLIP
WDP
AUDITOR_CHG

N
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608
608

Mean
0.27
0.60
50.06
19.87
0.43
5.20
0.76
2.24
0.41
0.32
0.08
0.60
0.16
0.13
1.32
0.47
(2.18)
(1.83)
0.60

Median

Std Dev

0.00
1.00
50.00
19.79
0.00
4.99
1.00
2.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

0.44
0.49
7.65
1.02
0.50
1.84
0.42
1.10
0.49
0.47
0.26
0.49
0.37
0.33
0.50
0.50
25.13
36.11
0.49

Min
0.00
0.00
27.00
17.05
0.00
(1.80)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.69
0.00
(509.35)
(899.00)
0.00

Q1
0.00
0.00
45.00
19.24
0.00
3.85
1.00
1.61
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Q3
1.00
1.00
55.50
20.44
1.00
6.39
1.00
2.89
1.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.10
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

Max
1.00
1.00
70.00
24.63
1.00
11.82
1.00
5.11
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
3.18
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and IPO Offer Price
Variable
IPO_PRICE
LN_IPO_PRICE
ICW_REGISTRANT
MW_ONLY
SD_ONLY
CD_ONLY
EPS
BV
NET_PROCEEDS
UW_SHARE
BIGN
LN_AGE
LIT
NEWCEO
CEOAGE

N
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590
590

Mean
15.03
2.63
0.26
0.15
0.03
0.01
0.32
0.00
0.79
0.08
0.76
2.20
0.44
0.60
49.89

Median

Std Dev

14.00
2.64
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.08
(0.00)
0.93
0.05
1.00
2.20
0.00
1.00
50.00

6.39
0.40
0.44
0.36
0.18
0.08
11.51
0.04
0.21
0.08
0.43
1.09
0.50
0.50
7.51

Min

Q1

Q3

5.00
1.39
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(5.35)
(0.05)
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
35.00

11.00
2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.55)
(0.01)
0.70
0.01
1.00
1.61
0.00
0.00
44.00

18.00
2.89
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.55
0.01
0.93
0.16
1.00
2.83
1.00
1.00
55.00

Max
43.00
4.08
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
7.93
0.13
0.98
0.21
1.00
5.11
1.00
1.00
68.00
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel C: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses
Variable
ICW_404
ICW_REGISTRANT
LN_TA
LACK_RESOURCES
LN_BUSSEG
LOSS
CR
INVREC
Z
BIGN
DIFF_AUD
LIT
LN_AGE
AU9550
FOREIGN
REST_REGISTRANT
LN_FEES
NAS

N
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785
785

Mean
0.06
0.32
5.91
0.17
1.24
0.37
3.60
0.17
128.02
0.86
0.17
0.46
2.06
0.63
0.55
0.16
13.68
0.14

Median

Std Dev

0.00
0.00
5.79
0.00
1.10
0.00
2.52
0.13
4.07
1.00
0.00
0.00
2.08
1.00
1.00
0.00
13.72
0.11

0.23
0.47
1.41
0.37
0.54
0.47
3.66
0.15
501.97
0.35
0.37
0.37
1.16
0.48
0.48
0.37
0.84
0.14

Min

Q1

0.00
0.00
0.44
0.00
0.29
0.00
0.31
0.00
0.87
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
10.52
0.00

0.00
0.00
4.99
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.48
0.05
2.20
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.39
0.00
0.00
0.00
13.18
0.02

Q3

Max

0.00
1.00
6.78
0.00
1.10
1.00
4.30
0.24
13.17
1.00
0.00
1.00
2.71
1.00
1.00
0.00
14.16
0.23

1.00
1.00
11.13
1.00
3.14
1.00
23.94
0.92
3446.98
1.00
1.00
1.00
5.11
1.00
1.00
1.00
16.68
0.70
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel D: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and SOX 404 Material Weaknesses Market Reaction
Variable
CAR
VICW_CLEAN
SILENT_ADVERSE
VICW_ADVERSE
LN_TA
BM
ACCEL
LEV
BHR
LN_GEOSEG
FOREIGN
SALES_GROWTH
INVT
LOSS
LN_AGE
UE
DIFF_AUD

N
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517
517

Mean
(0.01)
0.27
0.03
0.02
6.05
0.14
0.92
0.17
0.50
1.15
0.56
0.20
0.06
0.31
2.26
(0.01)
0.08

Median

Std Dev

(0.00)
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.94
0.07
1.00
0.05
0.00
1.10
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
2.30
0.00
0.00

0.09
0.45
0.16
0.15
1.38
0.78
0.27
0.22
0.50
0.96
0.50
0.40
0.10
0.46
1.09
0.05
0.28

Min

Q1

Q3

Max

(0.62)
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.52
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
(0.34)
0.00

(0.04)
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.04
0.04
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.79
(0.00)
0.00

0.03
1.00
0.00
0.00
6.99
0.15
1.00
0.33
1.00
1.79
1.00
0.00
0.08
1.00
2.89
0.00
0.00

0.57
1.00
1.00
1.00
11.88
1.19
1.00
0.78
1.00
3.76
1.00
1.00
0.49
1.00
5.11
0.08
1.00
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Table 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel E: Voluntary Disclosure of ICWs and Subsequent Misstatements
Variable
VICW
VICW_REST
REST
LN_TA
LN_BUSSEG
NEG_ROA
CR
INVREC
Z
BIGN
AUDITOR_CHG
LIT
AU9550
LN_AGE
FOREIGN
AS5_404
BODSIZE
DUALCEO
NAS

N
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635
635

Mean
0.24
0.10
0.21
6.26
1.32
0.40
3.10
0.18
142.28
0.85
0.06
0.43
0.62
2.24
0.43
0.55
8.03
0.43
0.16

Median

Std Dev

0.00
0.00
0.00
6.14
1.10
0.00
2.10
0.14
4.31
1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
2.19
0.00
1.00
8.00
0.00
0.12

0.43
0.30
0.41
1.58
0.57
0.49
3.27
0.16
631.27
0.36
0.23
0.50
0.49
1.17
0.50
0.50
1.57
0.49
0.16

Min
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.62
0.69
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
0.00
0.00

Q1
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.18
1.00
0.00
1.38
0.06
2.23
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.61
0.00
0.00
7.00
0.00
0.03

Q3

Max

0.00
0.00
0.00
7.31
1.61
1.00
3.46
0.26
13.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
2.83
1.00
1.00
9.00
1.00
0.25

1.00
1.00
1.00
12.02
3.18
1.00
19.92
0.80
4666.33
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
4.83
1.00
1.00
12.00
1.00
0.85
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Table 5
Logistic Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosure Incentives
ICW_REGISTRANT = β0 + β1 NEWCEO + β2 CEOAGE + β3 LN_MV + β4 LIT +
β5 LN_TA + β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 VC_BACKED + β9 PE_BACKED +
β10 CARVEOUT + β11 NASDAQ + β12 GC + β13 REST_REGISTRANT + β14 LN_BUSSEG
+ β15 FOREIGN + β16 GDWLIP + β17 WDP + β18 AUDITOR_CHG + ε
(1)
(2)
(3)
NEWCEO
0.554
0.554
(2.567)***
(2.562)***
CEOAGE
-0.002
-0.001
(-0.178)
(-0.085)
LN_MV
-0.026
0.025
-0.028
(-0.108)
(0.107)
(-0.116)
LIT
0.243
0.229
0.241
(1.773)**
(1.675)**
(1.755)**
LN_TA
-0.229
-0.216
-0.229
(-2.419)***
(-2.288)**
(-2.415)***
BIGN
-0.302
-0.365
-0.300
(-1.211)
(-1.479)
(-1.202)
LN_AGE
0.010
-0.011
0.011
(0.108)
(-0.114)
(0.113)
VC_BACKED
0.060
0.085
0.057
(0.189)
(0.268)
(0.179)
PE_BACKED
0.344
0.303
0.343
(1.242)
(1.103)
(1.237)
CARVEOUT
0.094
0.164
0.095
(0.243)
(0.430)
(0.246)
NASDAQ
0.022
-0.044
0.022
(0.093)
(-0.182)
(0.093)
GC
0.017
0.048
0.016
(0.061)
(0.174)
(0.060)
REST_REGISTRANT
1.533
1.411
1.531
(5.688)***
(5.361)***
(5.651)***
LN_BUSSEG
0.178
0.174
0.178
(0.816)
(0.806)
(0.815)
FOREIGN
0.668
0.684
0.669
(3.170)***
(3.267)***
(3.171)***
GDWLIP
-0.004
-0.005
-0.004
(-1.197)
(-1.285)
(-1.199)
WDP
-0.015
-0.022
-0.015
(-0.392)
(-0.562)
(-0.393)
AUDITOR_CHG
0.235
0.284
0.235
(1.126)
(1.370)
(1.124)
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INTERCEPT
ROC
GOF Chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R-squared
N

-5.923
(-2.351)***
0.693
0.191
0.094
608

-5.176
(-1.942)**
0.682
0.231
0.084
608

-5.842
(-2.169)**
0.694
0.182
0.094
608

Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic model estimation of equation (1) and zstatistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed), respectively,
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The dependent
variable, ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise)
if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness,
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. The variables of
interest are NEWCEO and CEOAGE. NEWCEO is an indicator variable equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the CEO tenure at the registrant is zero years at the IPO date.
CEOAGE is CEO age at the IPO date. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1
and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.
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Table 6
OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO Offer Prices
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW + β2 EPS + β3 BV + β4 NET_PROCEEDS + β5 UW_SHARE
+ β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 LIT + β9 NEWCEO + β10 CEOAGE + YearFE + ε
(1)
(2)
ICW_REGISTRANT
0.061
(2.075)**
MW_ONLY
0.092
(2.788)***
SD_ONLY
0.055
(0.878)
CD_ONLY
0.200
(1.516)
EPS
0.059
0.057
(5.251)***
(5.109)***
BV
1.898
1.887
(2.437)**
(2.425)**
NET_PROCEEDS
-0.051
-0.053
(-0.774)
(-0.803)
UW_SHARE
0.823
0.783
(4.064)***
(3.869)***
BIGN
0.032
0.033
(0.936)
(0.960)
LN_AGE
0.016
0.018
(1.100)
(1.235)
LIT
-0.174
-0.177
(-5.317)***
(-5.408)***
NEWCEO
-0.059
-0.055
(-1.368)
(-1.265)
CEOAGE
-0.008
-0.008
(-3.961)***
(-4.051)***
INTERCEPT
3.076
3.078
(23.780)***
(23.905)***
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Yes
R-squared
0.240
0.248
N
590
590
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the OLS model estimation of equation (2) and tstatistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively,
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The dependent
variable, LN_OFFER_PRICE, is the logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE. The
variables of interest ICW is one of the four following ICW disclosure measures:
ICW_REGISTRANT, MW_ONLY, SD_ONLY, and CD_ONLY. ICW_REGISTRANT
is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily
disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness, significant deficiency, or
control deficiency) in its registration statement. MW_ONLY is an indicator variable
equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one
material weakness in its registration statement. SD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal
to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one significant
deficiency in its registration statement. CD_ONLY is an indicator variable equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed at least one control deficiency
in its registration statement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99
percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.
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Table 7
Firth Logistic Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404
Material Weaknesses
ICW_404 = β0 + β1 ICW_REGISTRANT + β2 LN_TA + β3 LACK_RESOURCES +
β4 LN_BUSSEG + β5 LOSS + β6 CR + β7 INVREC + β8 Z + β9 BIGN + β10 DIFF_AUD +
β11 LN_AGE + β12 AU9550 + β13 FOREIGN + β14 REST_REGISTRANT + β15 LN_FEES +
β16 NAS + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε
ICW_REGISTRANT
LN_TA
LACK_RESOURCES
LN_BUSSEG
LOSS
CR
INVREC
Z
BIGN
DIFF_AUD
LN_AGE
AU9550
FOREIGN
REST_REGISTRANT
LN_FEES
NAS
INTERCEPT
Year Fixed Effects

(1)
1.061
(2.509)***
-0.053
(-0.266)
-0.120
(-0.265)
0.202
(0.619)
0.792
(2.246)***
0.035
(0.882)
0.451
(0.392)
-0.000
(-0.728)
-0.115
(-0.232)
0.518
(0.785)
0.038
(0.242)
0.391
(1.134)
0.564
(1.450)*
-0.204
(-0.463)
0.069
(0.218)
-1.042
(-0.805)
-3.720
(-0.995)
Yes

106
Industry Fixed Effects
N

Yes
785

Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the Firth logistic model estimation of equation (3)
and z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01
[or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed),
respectively, and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The
dependent variable, ICW_404, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise)
if the company’s auditor provides an adverse opinion in their first SOX 404 report. The
variable of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides
a summary of all variables.
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Table 8
OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and Subsequent SOX 404 Material
Weaknesses’ Cumulative Abnormal Returns
CAR (-1,1) = β0 + β1 VICW_CLEAN + β2 SILENT_ADVERSE + β3 VICW_ADVERSE +
β4 LN_TA + β5 BM + β6 ACCEL + β7 LEV + β8 BHR +β9 BIGN + β10 LN_GEOSEG +
β11 FOREIGN + β12 SALES_GROWTH + β13 INVT + β14 LOSS +β15 LN_AGE + β16 UE +
β17 DIFF_AUD + YearFE + IndustryFE + ε
(1)
VICW_CLEAN
-0.008
(-0.981)
SILENT_ADVERSE
-0.040
(-1.600)
VICW_ADVERSE
-0.041
(-1.852)*
LN_TA
-0.003
(-0.577)
BM
0.028
(0.840)
ACCEL
0.031
(1.730)*
LEV
0.024
(1.018)
BHR
-0.004
(-0.475)
BIGN
-0.016
(-1.276)
LN_GEOSEG
0.007
(1.328)
FOREIGN
0.007
(0.722)
SALE_GROWTH
0.009
(0.727)
INVT
0.013
(0.247)
LOSS
-0.009
(-0.933)
LN_AGE
0.005
(1.226)
UE
0.121
(1.316)
DIFF_AUD
0.011
(0.705)
INTERCEPT
-0.040
(-0.956)
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Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
R-squared
N

Yes
Yes
0.052
517

Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the OLS model estimation of equation (4) and tstatistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1
percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively,
and are derived from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The dependent
variable, CAR (-1,1), is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (equally
weighted index) over days minus 1 and 1, where day 0 is the filing date of the annual
financial statements including an internal control over financial reporting opinion. The
variables of interest are VICW_CLEAN, SILENT_ADVERSE, and VICW_ADVERSE.
VICW_CLEAN, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness,
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement and received an
unqualified SOX 404 audit opinion in its second annual report. SLIENT_ADVERSE is
an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant did not voluntarily
disclosed any deficient internal controls in its registration statement and received an
adverse SOX 404 audit opinion in its second annual report. VICW_ADVERSE is an
indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed
any deficient internal controls in its registration statement and received an adverse SOX
404 audit opinion in its second annual report. All continuous variables are winsorized at
the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.

109
Table 9
Logistic Regression of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Indicators
DFRQ = β0 + β1 LN_TA + β2 LN_BUSSEG + β3 NEG_ROA + β4 CR + β5 INVREC + β6 Z
+ β7 BIGN + β8 AUDITOR_CHG + β9 LIT + β10 AU9550 + β11 LN_AGE + β12 FOREIGN
+ β13 AS5_404 + β14 BODSIZE + β15 DUALCEO +β16 NAS + ε

LN_TA

LN_BUSSEG

NEG_ROA

CR

INVREC

Z

BIGN

AUDITOR_CHG

LIT

AU9550

LN_AGE

FOREGIN

(1)
VICW
0.253
(2.471)**
[1.287]
0.131
(0.668)
[1.140]
-0.166
(-0.707)
[-0.847]
-0.040
(-0.842)
[-0.961]
2.186
(3.127)***
[8.898]
0.000
(0.922)
[1.000]
-0.123
(-0.379)
[-0.884]
-0.308
(-0.630)
[-0.735]
0.210
(0.855)
[1.233]
-0.481
(-2.308)**
[-0.618]
-0.121
(-1.367)
[-0.886]
0.662
(2.757)***

(2)
VICW_REST
-0.071
-(0.519)
[-0.931]
0.320
(1.118)
[1.377]
-0.453
(-1.398)
[-0.635]
-0.067
(-1.247)
[-0.935]
-2.405
(-2.286)**
[-0.090]
0.000
(1.705)*
[1.000]
-0.916
(-2.400)**
[-0.400]
-0.309
(-0.529)
[-0.734]
0.416
(1.270)
[1.515]
-0.349
(-1.182)
[-0.705]
-0.010
(-0.072)
[-0.990]
0.648
(1.957)*

(3)
REST
-0.028
(-0.280)
[-0.973]
-0.090
(-0.431)
[-0.914]
0.134
(0.585)
[1.143]
0.011
(0.344)
[1.011]
-1.409
(-1.842)*
[-0.244]
-0.000
(-1.095)
[-1.000]
0.139
(0.432)
[1.149]
-0.011
(-0.026)
[-0.989]
-0.307
(-1.306)
[-0.736]
0.453
(2.006)**
[1.574]
0.083
(0.908)
[1.086]
0.066
(0.281)

110

AS5_404

BODSIZE

DUALCEO

NAS

INTERCEPT

ROC
GOF Chi2 (p-value)
Pseudo R-squared
N

[1.939]
0.999
(4.114)***
[2.715]
-0.270
(-3.558)***
[-0.763]
-0.302
(-1.414)
[-0.739]
-1.875
(-2.465)**
[-0.153]
-1.169
(-1.426)
[-0.311]
0.746
0.341
0.119
635

[1.191]
-0.899
(-3.048)***
[-0.407]
-0.145
(-1.474)
[-0.865]
-0.417
(-1.408)
[-0.659]
-0.335
(-0.381)
[-0.715]
0.829
(0.781)
[2.291]
0.723
0.832
0.086
635

[1.068]
-0.879
(-4.147)***
[-0.415]
-0.093
(-1.331)
[-0.911]
0.142
(0.669)
[1.152]
0.401
(0.626)
[1.494]
-0.220
(-0.285)
[-0.803]
0.633
0.259
0.048
635

Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic regression estimation of equation (5)
and z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01
[or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed),
respectively, and are derived from test statistics based on robust standard errors. Odds
ratios are in brackets. See Table 1 for observation totals for the outcomes. The
dependent variable, DFRQ, is one of the three following categorical variables: VICW,
VICW_REST, and REST. VICW is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement,
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and does not have a
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial
reporting opinion. VICW_REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement,
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has a
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial
reporting opinion. REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an
unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion, and has a corresponding
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting
opinion. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels.
Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.

Table 10
Tests of Coefficients in Separate Regressions of Degrading Financial Reporting Quality Groups
DFRQ = β0 + β1 LN_TA + β2 LN_BUSSEG + β3 NEG_ROA + β4 CR + β5 INVREC + β6 Z + β7 BIGN +
β8 AUDITOR_CHG + β9 LIT + β10 AU9550 + β11 LN_AGE + β12 FOREIGN + β13 AS5_404 +
β14 BODSIZE + β15 DUALCEO +β16 NAS + ε
(1)
VICW
LN_TA
LN_BUSSEG
NEG_ROA
CR
INVREC
Z
BIGN
AUDITOR_CHG
LIT
AU9550
LN_AGE
FOREIGN
AS5_404
BODSIZE
DUALCEO
NAS

1.287**
1.140
-0.847
-0.961
8.898***
1.000
-0.884
-0.735
1.233
-0.618**
-0.886
1.939***
2.715***
-0.763***
-0.739
-0.153***

(2)
VICW_REST
-0.931
1.377
-0.635
-0.935
-0.090***
1.000
-0.400**
-0.734
1.515
-0.705
-0.990
1.191*
-0.407***
-0.865*
-0.659
-0.715

(3)
REST

(1) vs (2)
Sig Diff

(1) vs (3)
Sig Diff

(2) vs (3)
Sig Diff

-0.973
-0.914
1.143
1.011
-0.244*
-1.000
1.149
-0.989
-0.736
1.574*
1.086
1.068
-0.415***
-0.911
1.152
1.494

6.23‡‡
1.96
2.68
2.30
18.61‡‡‡
4.82‡
6.65‡‡
0.74
3.25
9.07‡‡
2.57
14.29‡‡‡
22.18‡‡‡
14.70‡‡‡
4.82‡
8.21‡‡

6.13‡‡
0.46
0.65
0.99
13.45‡‡
1.74
0.21
0.39
2.01
7.22‡‡
2.74
9.70‡‡
27.47‡‡‡
15.71‡‡‡
1.93
7.68‡‡

0.45
1.32
1.78
1.06
14.79‡‡
3.29
6.00‡‡
0.24
2.71
4.29
0.84
4.18
32.66‡‡‡
5.61‡
2.15
0.56
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the logistic regression estimation of equation (5).
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5
percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, and are derived from
test statistics based on robust standard errors. See Table 1 for observation totals for the
outcomes. The dependent variable, DFRQ, is one of the three following categorical
variables: VICW, VICW_REST, and REST. VICW is an indicator variable equal to one
(and zero otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration
statement, has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and does
not have a corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over
financial reporting opinion. VICW_REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily discloses ICWs in the IPO registration statement,
has an unqualified internal control over financial reporting opinion, and has a
corresponding misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial
reporting opinion. REST is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant does not voluntarily disclose ICWs in the IPO registration statement, has an
unqualified internal control of financial reporting opinion, and has a corresponding
misstatement for the year mentioned in the internal control over financial reporting
opinion. Coefficient “sig diff” reported at significance levels of ‡‡‡, ‡‡, and ‡ denote
statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05 [or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10
percent] levels based on chi-square distribution using seemingly unrelated estimation
(SUEST). Appendix B provides a summary of all variables.
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Table 11
Etregress Treatment Model: Probability of Voluntary ICW Disclosures
TREAT (ICW_REGISTRANT) = β0 + β1 IND_PRESSURE + β2 NEWCEO + β3 CEOAGE
+ β4 LN_MV + β5 LIT + β6 LN_TA + β7 BIGN + β8 LN_AGE + β9 VC_BACKED +
β10 PE_BACKED + β11 CARVEOUT + β12 NASDAQ + β13 GC + β14 REST_REGISTRANT
+ β15 LN_BUSSEG + β16 FOREIGN + β17 GDWLIP + β18 WDP + β19 AUDITOR_CHG + ε
(1)
IND_PRESSURE
1.656
(1.922)*
NEWCEO
0.296
(2.320)***
CEOAGE
0.000
(-0.059)
LN_MV
0.144
(1.780)*
LIT
-0.047
(-0.326)
LN_TA
-0.106
(-1.894)*
BIGN
-0.239
(-1.600)
LN_AGE
-0.006
(-0.103)
VC_BACKED
-0.047
(-0.244)
PE_BACKED
0.090
(0.534)
CARVEOUT
0.114
(0.500)
NASDAQ
0.038
(0.264)
GC
0.002
(0.009)
REST_REGISTRANT
0.860
(5.068)***
LN_BUSSEG
0.146
(1.105)
FOREIGN
0.363
(2.913)***
GDWLIP
-0.003
(-1.212)
WDP
-0.005
(-0.200)
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AUDITOR_CHG
INTERCEPT
Wald Chi2
Prob > Chi2
N

0.121
(0.977)
-3.978
(-2.480)***
195.270
0.000
590

Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the linear regression model augmented with an
endogenous binary-treatment variable estimation of equation (6) and z-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05
[or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (one-tailed), respectively, and are derived
from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The dependent variable,
ICW_REGISTRANT is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero otherwise) if the
registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material weakness,
significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. The variable of
interest is IND_PRESSURE, which is the ratio of the number of registrants voluntarily
disclosing ICWs in their registration statements for each Fama-French industry
classification minus one divided by the total number of IPO registrants in the industry.
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B
provides a summary of all variables.
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Table 12
Etregress Outcome Model: OLS Regression of Voluntary ICW Disclosures and IPO
Offer Prices
LN_IPO_PRICE = β0 + β1 ICW_REGISTRANT + β2 EPS + β3 BV + β4 NET_PROCEEDS
+ β5 UW_SHARE + β6 BIGN + β7 LN_AGE + β8 LIT + β9 NEWCEO + β10 CEOAGE +
β11 LAMDA + YearFE + ε
(1)
ICW_REGISTRANT
0.251
(2.353)**
EPS
0.055
(5.419)***
BV
2.271
(3.032)***
NET_PROCEEDS
-0.009
(-0.226)
UW_SHARE
0.996
(4.943)***
BIGN
0.034
(0.918)
LN_AGE
0.018
(1.301)
LIT
-0.194
(-5.814)***
NEWCEO
-0.060
(-1.450)
CEOAGE
-0.006
(-2.926)***
LAMDA
-0.121
(-1.859)*
INTERCEPT
2.878
(22.843)***
Year Fixed Effects
Yes
Wald Chi2
195.270
Prob > Chi2
0.000
N
590
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Notes: Coefficient estimates are from the linear regression model augmented with an
endogenous binary-treatment variable estimation of equation (7) and t-statistics are in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01 [or 1 percent], 0.05
[or 5 percent], and 0.10 [or 10 percent] levels (two-tailed), respectively, and are derived
from test statistics based on normal standard errors. The dependent variable,
LN_OFFER_PRICE, is the logarithmic transformation of the IPO_PRICE. The variable
of interest, ICW_REGISTRANT, is an indicator variable equal to one (and zero
otherwise) if the registrant voluntarily disclosed any deficient internal controls (material
weakness, significant deficiency, or control deficiency) in its registration statement. All
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent levels. Appendix B provides
a summary of all variables.

